COENEN FINAL.DOC

11/28/2006 3:50 PM

A RHETORIC FOR RATIFICATION:
THE ARGUMENT OF THE FEDERALIST
AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
DAN T. COENEN †
ABSTRACT
Courts, lawyers, and scholars have long assumed that The
Federalist Papers supply important information for use in
constitutional argument and interpretation. In recent years,
commentators have questioned this view. Their skepticism grows out
of two major concerns. First, Justice Scalia’s challenge to the use of
legislative history in the statutory context casts a cloud over judicial
use of background texts such as The Federalist in seeking the
meaning of the Constitution. Second, even if courts may rely on some
background materials in interpreting the Constitution, there is reason
to conclude that The Federalist does not qualify as the sort of
material that provides useful guidance. The basic difficulty is that the
authors of The Federalist wrote their essays as advocacy documents
for publication in local newspapers, rather than as scholarly texts
designed to lay out in neutral fashion the purposes and terms of the
Constitution. Building on this historical reality, analysts have properly
asked why courts should view a series of editorials, churned out to
help win a heated political battle, as a key modern-day source of
constitutional interpretation.
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Publius’s own misspellings and outmoded style of punctuation.
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This Article explores the proper role of The Federalist in the
search for constitutional meaning. It demonstrates that the essays were
in fact sophisticated advocacy documents that wove together different
styles of rhetoric designed to win over readers to the cause of
ratification. This reality requires courts to approach the papers with a
measure of caution. At the same time, the Article rejects the view that
the campaign-literature purpose of The Federalist disqualifies it from
serving as an important touchstone of constitutional interpretation.
This is the case primarily because the authors of The Federalist, in
conceiving and structuring their argument, focused on making a
highly rational and highly comprehensive appeal to a broad and
diverse audience. Against this backdrop, The Federalist should be
viewed as setting forth something akin to a consensus understanding
of the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federalist stands, head and shoulders above all else, as the
most significant book in the history of American law and political
theory. Authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay, The Federalist contains eighty-five essays on the origins,
purposes, and teachings of the Constitution. The essays range across
every major subject of constitutional interpretation: the separation of
powers, federalism, the judicial role, republicanism, the proper scope
of the congressional powers, the roots of legitimate government, the
1
functions of the president, and the nature of rights.
The importance of The Federalist cannot be overstated.
Throughout American history it has provided a pivot point of
argument in great struggles over constitutional meaning. Hamilton
and Madison themselves drew on The Federalist in debates over the
constitutionality of the National Bank Act and other early assertions
2
of federal authority. In the years leading up to the Civil War,
Southern nullificationists and Northern unionists both invoked the
3
essays, and modern-day proponents and opponents of sweeping
4
executive powers have done so as well. In scores of cases, and with
much-increased frequency in recent decades, the Supreme Court has
drawn on The Federalist in resolving hard-fought battles over what
the Constitution means for disputants in the context of federal
5
litigation. The essays are also the stuff of high political drama. In the

1. For an extensive examination of The Federalist’s treatment of these subjects, see
generally Dan T. Coenen, The Story of The Federalist: How Hamilton and Madison
Reconceived America (April 21, 2006) (unpublished book manuscript, on file with the author).
2. Hamilton, for instance, quoted from Madison’s The Federalist No. 44 in arguing that
the bank bill was constitutional. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 321 (1971). Madison, in
turn, quoted from Hamilton’s treatment of the executive in The Federalist in challenging
Hamilton’s support for the president’s unilateral issuance of a proclamation of neutrality. Id. at
346–47.
3. See Jack N. Rakove, Early Uses of The Federalist, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION 234,
239 (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1987) (“During the debate over the admission to the Union of
Maine and Missouri, eight out of nine speakers who cited The Federalist did so while justifying
the right of states to determine the propriety of slavery.”).
4. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES OF
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 7 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (citing The Federalist No. 70 as
supporting the president’s authority in the area of national security); id. at 30 (citing The
Federalist No. 64 for the president’s authority to undertake intelligence activities without
congressional approval).
5. See Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1324, 1329 (1998) (documenting the Supreme Court’s common and increasing use of The

COENEN FINAL.DOC

472

11/28/2006 3:50 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:469

broadly publicized hearings on the appointments of John Roberts and
Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, for example, participants alluded
6
to The Federalist on no fewer than eleven occasions.
Against this backdrop, Americans often assume that the authors
of The Federalist prepared their famous text as a legal treatise or as a
scholarly recapitulation on how the Constitution came to be. This
view is wrong. In fact, the authors first published their essays in New
York newspapers while citizens of that state struggled with whether
7
to support or oppose the proposed Constitution. More particularly,
the Federalist essays responded to a torrent of tracts published by
Constitution-opposing editorial writers who were at work in a key
8
state where a majority of voters appeared to lean against ratification.
In short, The Federalist was an advocacy document, perhaps even
9
“propaganda.” Either way, the essential purpose of the essays was to
set forth an argument. That argument, in turn, was designed to
maintain the loyalties of existing federalists while bringing undecided
and unsympathetic voters over to the proratification cause.
Recognizing this essential function of The Federalist raises two basic,
but little-explored, questions: First, just how did the essays’ authors
seek to persuade the essays’ readers? Second, how does the nature of
the argument of The Federalist bear on judicial use of the essays in
the modern day? In this article, I seek to offer answers to these
questions.
In Part I, I set the stage for further inquiry by sketching the
historical context in which the essays were written. Because the
purpose of The Federalist was to persuade citizens to elect ratification
convention delegates who would support the Constitution, the

Federalist in recent years); Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Jennifer Miller, The Supreme Court and
The Federalist: A Supplement, 1996–2001, 90 KY. L.J. 415, 420–40 (2001) (tabulating references
to The Federalist in Supreme Court opinions).
6. See Transcripts: The Roberts Confirmation Hearings, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/09/14/LI2005091402149.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (statements
of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Sen. John Cornyn, Judge John Roberts, and Sen. Tom Coburn); Campaign
for the Supreme Court: The Politics of the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., http://blogs.
washingtonpost.com/campaignforthecourt/2006/01/hearing_transcr.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2006) (statements of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 18–20.
8. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 262 (2004) (noting that the antifederalist
delegation elected to the New York ratification convention was over twice as large as that of the
federalists).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 5
(1980).
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immediate circumstances in which those citizens found themselves
were of extreme importance to Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. Part I
thus directs attention to key background facts of the time, including
the already-demonstrated shortcomings of the Articles of
Confederation, mounting frustrations with interstate trade conflicts,
and rising fears brought on by growing debtor militancy, evidenced
most pointedly by the Massachusetts uprising known as Shays’s
Rebellion.
Building on Part I, I set forth in Part II a typology of the
rhetorical techniques used by the authors of The Federalist. I created
this typology by employing a three-step process. First, I extracted all
significant lines of argument presented in each of the eighty-five
essays on all of the many subjects of controversy of the time (for
example, the need for a strengthened union to enhance military
capabilities and commercial prosperity, the appropriateness of twoyear terms for House members and six-year terms for senators, the
legitimacy of judicial review, etc.). Second, I sought to identify the
different styles of argument that cut across The Federalist’s treatment
of these topics. Finally, I characterized and contrasted these styles,
double-checking along the way to see that each subject-matter
argument I had identified fell into at least one rhetorical category.
In the end, I conclude that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay utilized
six major tools of argument. They made appeals to (1) the particular
circumstances of their audience; (2) the lessons of history; (3)
practical reasoning; (4) imagery and metaphor; (5) the need for
compromise; and (6) emotional responses, including responses
inspired by America’s revolutionary experience. Other observers
might well group the rhetorical tools of The Federalist in other ways.
The key point to glean from this exercise, however, does not depend
on precisely how the process of counting and characterizing is done.
The key point is that—however that process might be fine-tuned—the
argumentative strategy of The Federalist was nuanced and complex.
In Part III of the article, I explore the implications of Part II. In
particular, I address the question whether courts may legitimately use
The Federalist as a tool of modern-day constitutional interpretation.
Answering this question proves difficult because others have
advanced a host of different theories as to why judicial use of the
essays makes sense. I seek to show that the argumentative style of the
essays creates difficulties for each of these theories, especially
theories based on the utility of The Federalist as legislative history, as
a dictionary-like guide to eighteenth-century word meanings, or as a
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learned legal treatise. The argumentative style of the essays, however,
supports the case for citing The Federalist in one important way.
Because the Papers’ authors sought to build wide support for the
Constitution through careful appeals to reason, there is cause to view
their work as approaching a consensus understanding.
I. THE CONTEXT SURROUNDING THE FEDERALIST
On September 17, 1787, the members of the Constitutional
Convention gathered for their last meeting in Philadelphia’s
Independence Hall. After months of toil that had demanded
compromise by every delegate, these statesmen prepared to sign a
charter of government like none that had ever existed before. There
was cause for celebration, and a sense of accomplishment filled the
chamber. Doubts for the future, however, mixed with the thrill of the
moment.
Worries stemmed from the Constitution itself. In the document’s
final article, the framers specified that the states should hold special
ratification conventions to consider whether to approve the
10
Constitution and thereby bring it into effect. Nobody could predict
what would happen at those conventions, but everyone could see
storm clouds on the horizon. Most ominously, as the Convention
closed, the delegations of the two most populous states, Virginia and
11
Massachusetts, found themselves sharply divided.
Edmund
Randolph, joined in dissent by fellow Virginian George Mason, took
12
the floor to predict that “[n]ine States will fail to ratify the plan.”
Elbridge Gerry, one of three Massachusetts delegates, likewise
refused to sign the charter, predicting that in his state the
Constitution might well contribute to the “calamitous event” of “a
13
Civil war.”
The news from New York was even less encouraging. That state
had sent three delegates to Philadelphia—John Lansing, Jr., Robert
Yates, and Alexander Hamilton. In July, however, the states-rights-

10. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
11. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 648–49 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (“The Constitution being signed by all the members except Mr. Randolph [of
Virginia], Mr. Mason [of Virginia], and Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] who declined to give it the
sanction of their names.”).
12. Id. at 645–46; see also id. at 631 (setting forth a plan for inviting amendments from state
delegations and then holding a second convention in anticipation of failed ratification).
13. Id. at 647.
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minded Lansing and Yates abandoned the Convention altogether,
stripping New York of even a quorum entitled to vote and leaving
Hamilton as the state’s sole signatory of the final constitutional
14
proposal. By its terms, the Constitution would come into effect upon
ratification by nine states. Everyone knew, however, that the new
nation stood little chance of success without the strategically situated
state of New York, and it stood no chance at all if Virginia or
15
Massachusetts abandoned the enterprise as well.
Things would soon get worse for supporters of the Constitution.
As the document circulated through the former colonies, prominent
critics stepped forward in large numbers. Dissenters included famous
patriots, such as Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, as
well as influential local leaders, such as Luther Martin of Maryland
16
and James Winthrop of Massachusetts.
Opponents of the
17
Constitution, who became known as “antifederalists,” moved swiftly
to block ratification. Scores of essayists, using names like “Cato,” “A
Plebeian,” and “Centinel,” directed an avalanche of criticisms at the
proposed Constitution almost as soon as it was made public by the
18
Philadelphia conventioneers.

14. Signature by just one of New York’s three delegates meant that the state did not
officially join in the act of promulgating the Constitution, a fact in some tension with assertions
later made in The Federalist that “all the deputations composing the Convention . . . were
induced to accede . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 239 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
15. See, e.g., Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at vii, viii–ix (Buccaneer Books
1992) (noting that a successful government would require participation by Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and that “New York was the most difficult case with the
strongest opposition”); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 250 (2d ed. 2005) (finding that “the new government would have
little prospect of succeeding” without the “large, powerful, and centrally located states” of New
York and Virginia); JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783–1789,
at 340 (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1888) (arguing that “the Union could never be cemented
without” New York).
16. Martin, who was Maryland’s attorney general at the time, had previously been a
member of the Confederation Congress and the Philadelphia Convention, which he had left in
disgust before its completion. Gregory Stiverson, Maryland: Necessity, the Mother of Union, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES 131, 145 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds.,
1988). Winthrop took the lead in opposing the Constitution in Massachusetts, including by
writing critiques under the pen name “Agrippa.” RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE
CREATION 225 (1985).
17. See, e.g., LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR 170 (1966).
18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 263 (noting that
“publications . . . have swarmed against the Convention”). See generally 2–6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (collecting antifederalist tracts).
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The chances for ratification in New York looked especially
bleak. Prominent antifederalists such as Melancton Smith trumpeted
19
objections to the charter; Lansing and Yates soon joined the chorus;
and the local essayist “Brutus” (believed by many to have been Yates
20
himself ) leveled trenchant attacks against the Constitution. These
critics had much material to work with, especially in appealing to
residents of a state that had weathered recent economic distresses far
better than most of the other former colonies. That the Empire State,
with a population of over 300,000, was given no more voice in the
21
Senate than Rhode Island, with a population of some 68,000, struck
22
many New Yorkers as outrageous. Some local citizens worried that a
federal monopoly over import taxes would disadvantage a state that
had long leveraged its famous port to impose duties borne in large
23
part by nonresident buyers and sellers. Still other New Yorkers
feared that a strengthened federal Congress would reject land claims
24
made by the state with regard to the disputed territory of Vermont.
Most important of all, the state’s leading political figure, Governor

19. See John P. Kaminski, New York: Adjusting to Circumstances, in THE CONSTITUTION
STATES 225, 234–35 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988) (“Yates and
Lansing waited a while before publicly declaring their objections to the proposed
constitution.”).
20. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 358.
21. The 1790 census reported that New York had a population of 340,120 and Rhode
Island a population of 68,825. RICHARD L. FORSTALL, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, POPULATION
OF STATES AND COUNTIES OF THE UNITED STATES: 1790–1990, at 4 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Brutus III, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 377, 379 (criticizing as “unreasonable, and unjust” the equality of
representation between Delaware on the one hand and Massachusetts and Virginia on the
other). But see id. at 447 n.26 (editorial note) (observing that “[t]he question of the
apportionment of Senate seats equally among the states was one on which the Anti-Federalists
were equivocal” and that several antifederalists, including Brutus, seem not to have been
consistent on this point).
23. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 28–29 (1986) (footnote omitted) (noting that “the
manorial lords of the Hudson valley region . . . took advantage of [their] predominance to shift
the burden of taxation from the land to imports, and this fact contributed powerfully to [their]
opposition to the Constitution, because it implied a transference of the weight of taxation for
state purposes to the soil”); CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 244 (asserting that “[t]he tariff issue
held special force in New York”). But see DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 174 & n.19 (discussing the
conflicting views of historians Thomas C. Cochran and Forrest McDonald on whether impostrelated concerns were a significant factor as New Yorkers considered the Constitution).
24. See Kaminski, supra note 19, at 228–29 (“The state’s claim to the area known as
Vermont was disputed” and “delegates warned [Governor] Clinton about the possible attempts
to seize New York’s northwestern territory”).
AND THE
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25

George Clinton, took up the antifederalist banner. Support for the
Constitution from George Washington, who had served as President
of the Philadelphia Convention, and Benjamin Franklin, who had sat
as the Convention’s most senior member, surely counted for
something. These icons, however, did not hail from New York, where
the popular Governor Clinton wielded a potent influence. That
influence was so great that some believed the governor alone would
26
determine in the end the outcome of the ratification battle.
It was into this vortex that Alexander Hamilton chose to throw
his talents as a theorist, strategist, and writer. Hamilton was an
27
28
archenemy of Governor Clinton, an experienced political essayist,
29
and a lawyer steeped in the skills of advocacy. He had a
commitment to the constitutional project matched by few in America,

25. See, e.g., JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON 135 (1993) (noting that Clinton at first
“refused to take a public stand on the new form of government” but that, “[w]ithin a short time,
the governor’s opposition to the Constitution was widely reported”).
26. John P. Kaminski has noted that Clinton was very popular as governor, id. at 9, and
William L. Stone wrote of the “vast influence” Clinton wielded “in his day,” William L. Stone,
George Clinton, MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY, June 1879, at 329, 354. Indeed, Clinton
was so popular that he was elected seven times. KAMINSKI, supra note 25, at 2. According to
federalists, the governor was indeed the focal point of the opposition. Referring to Clinton, one
observer opined that “‘[t]he Helmsman leads a majority by the nose just as he pleases.’” John P.
Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant Pillar, in THE RELUCTANT PILLAR 48, 99 (Stephen L.
Schechter ed., 1985) (quoting Extract of a letter from New York (July 20, 1788), in NEW
HAMPSHIRE SPY, July 29, 1788).
27. For example, in a piece dated July 21, 1787, anonymously published in the Daily
Advertiser, Hamilton accused Governor Clinton of undermining the work of the Philadelphia
Convention. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 237. Hamilton wrote that “such conduct in a man high
in office, argues greater attachment to his own power than to the public good, and furnishes
strong reason to suspect a dangerous predetermination to oppose whatever may tend to
diminish the former, however it may promote the latter.” Alexander Hamilton, N.Y. DAILY
ADVERTISER, July 21, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 229, 232
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). Not surprisingly, this letter stirred much hostility in the state and
helped render Hamilton and Clinton lifelong political antagonists. Hamilton’s antipathy for
Governor Clinton also surfaced in The Federalist. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 518 (asserting that “a great number of very improper
appointments” had been made by the executive council, which included Governor Clinton;
noting that “whether he [seeks] the advancement of persons, whose chief merit is their implicit
devotion to his will” and whether he seeks to advance a “despicable and dangerous system of
personal influence, are questions which unfortunately for the community can only be the
subjects of speculation and conjecture”).
28. See GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 59 (1981) (noting Hamilton’s early work as
an essayist, beginning at age eighteen).
29. See, e.g., CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 168 (noting that Hamilton’s law manual was “so
expertly done, its copious information so rigorously pigeonholed, that it was copied by hand and
circulated among New York law students for years”).
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and he also had valuable experience in government—as Washington’s
chief aide in the early years of the Revolution, as a battlefield
commander later in the war, as a member of the New York legislature
following the Revolution, and as a representative to the
30
Confederation Congress. Hamilton’s legendary self-assurance was in
full flower by 1787, as was his unmatched zeal in battling political
31
adversaries of every sort. Propelled by these forces, Hamilton took
the lead in defending the Constitution in his home state.
The first order of business was to devise a plan. Hamilton would
do what was expected by meeting with local citizens, by plotting
federalist tactics, and by seeking one of the 65 seats at his state’s
32
ratifying convention. The core of his strategy, however, involved a
project so ambitious that it was not pursued anywhere else in the
nation. Hamilton would oversee the production of an elaborate series
of essays, to be published in local newspapers, that made the case for
33
ratification. In keeping with the fashion of the day, these tracts
would bear only a pen name, and—in an effort to sound a high-toned
note of public-spiritedness—Hamilton chose the title “Publius.”
Hamilton’s next order of business was to find collaborators. New
York’s most prominent federalist, John Jay, quickly signed onto the
project. Jay had not served as a delegate to the Philadelphia
Convention, but he was an ardent supporter of the Constitution and a
well-versed student of government. Indeed, few Americans—and no
34
New Yorkers—could match Jay’s record of federal service. He had
sat as a delegate to both the First and the Second Continental
Congresses, as President of the wartime federal Congress, and as
minister to Spain from 1780 to 1782. Along with fellow luminaries
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, Jay had served on the
negotiating team that produced the peace treaty that ended the
Revolutionary War and, as of the time of the writing of The

30. See id. at 100–02 (as Washington’s aide); id. at 163–64 (as commander at Yorktown); id.
at 173 (service in Confederation Congress); id. at 221 (service in New York Assembly).
31. See, e.g., id. at 60 (describing the “slashing style of attack” that “would make Hamilton
the most feared polemicist in America”).
32. See DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 186 (“Alexander Hamilton held a seat from New
York . . . .”).
33. See, e.g., CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 222 (describing Hamilton as “editorial
impresario” of the Papers); id. at 246 (reporting that “Hamilton conceived [the] ambitious
writing project”).
34. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 254 (1996) (noting that “Jay was the most
prominent national official” after 1783).
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Federalist, he held the Confederation’s most important office as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In the end, however, Jay would
contribute little to the project. A severe bout of rheumatism put him
on the sidelines after he completed only four tracts, and he would
35
later find time to pen only one more essay.
Who would fill the breach created by Jay’s unavailability?
Gouvernor Morris declined an invitation to participate, and William
Duer, a New York City federalist who would later write as “PhiloPublius,” proved incapable of producing work that met Hamilton’s
36
exacting standards. The great stroke of luck, for Hamilton and for
the nation, came through a coincidence of scheduling. Following its
formation in 1781, the hapless federal legislature created by the
Articles of Confederation had wandered from Philadelphia to
37
Princeton to Annapolis to Trenton. In the fall and winter of 1787,
however, the Confederation Congress was meeting in New York
38
City. This turn of events meant that Virginia representative James
Madison, fresh from the Constitutional Convention, was near at hand
as Hamilton contemplated who should help him wield the quill of
39
Publius.
Madison was uniquely well qualified to collaborate on the
project. Like Hamilton, he was an ardent student of government who
had served in both his own state’s legislature and the Confederation
40
Congress. Madison had also played a key role at the Philadelphia

35. DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 106–07.
36. Id. at 107–08. Duer had previously “served in the Continental Congress” and the
convention that framed the New York Constitution. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 293. He was
also an inveterate speculator and a continuing presence in Hamilton’s life. In particular, Duer’s
later mishandling of joint business dealings would later bring Hamilton great embarrassment
and Duer himself seven years in debtors’ prison. See id. at 381–88 (Duer “was packed off to
debtors’ prison” and “Hamilton was appalled to learn of Madison’s allegation that his purchases
of government securities to steady the market had been made at high prices to benefit
speculators”).
37. See FISKE, supra note 15, at 271 (“[T]he Continental Congress had skipped about from
Philadelphia to Princeton, to Annapolis, to Trenton, to New York, until it had become a
laughing-stock . . . .”).
38. Congress had been meeting in New York since November 7, 1785. See 23 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at xii (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995) (providing chronology).
39. See Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 659, 659
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) (asserting that Hamilton brought in Madison
“ironically, only after several others had declined his invitation”).
40. See KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 158 (calling Madison the “leader of the group anxious
to continue the reform in the laws of Virginia”); id. at 179 (attributing Madison’s candidacy and
election to a desire to maintain the credibility of the national government).
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Convention itself, including by crafting the main features of the socalled Virginia Plan, which had provided the starting point for
41
discussions among the delegates. Madison, in contrast to Hamilton,
had dutifully attended and fruitfully participated in every session of
the Convention. He had also taken extensive notes of the proceedings
and written lengthy tracts on constitutional theory even before the
42
Convention commenced. If Hamilton was a lightning rod of
controversy, Madison—at least as of 1787—seemed to be a paragon
43
of understated brilliance and good will. Writing of the Virginian,
Georgia delegate William Pierce observed:
[E]very Person seems to acknowledge his greatness. He blends
together the profound politician, with the Scholar . . . . From a spirit
of industry and application which he possesses in a most eminent
degree, he always comes forward the best informed Man of any
44
point in debate.

Pierce added that “[i]n the management of every great question,”
Madison “took the lead in the Convention”—and rightly so because,
about “[t]he affairs of the United States, he perhaps, has the most
45
correct knowledge of, of any Man in the Union.”
That history has adjudged Madison the “Father of the
46
Constitution” suggests that Pierce was right in emphasizing his
47
critical role in bringing about the “Miracle at Philadelphia.” The

41. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 59 (noting that the Virginia delegation approved
“articles incorporating the essential elements of Madison’s pre-Convention analysis” and that
this Virginia Plan provided the focal point for the Convention’s early debates).
42. See KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 184–89 (detailing Madison’s research and writings on
the theory of the extended republic); id. at 195–96 (describing Madison’s motivation for taking
notes during the Philadelphia Convention).
43. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 53 (2000) (observing that Madison
“seemed to lack a personal agenda” and was “eager to give credit to others, especially his
opponents”); id. at 57 (noting that “[u]nlike Jefferson, he could be genuinely gracious in
defeat”); id. at 74 (highlighting “Madison’s matchless political savvy”).
44. William Pierce, Character Sketches of Delegates to the Federal Convention, in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 87, 94.
45. Id.
46. See Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST 1, 8 (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (noting that Madison, though “on the losing side in a number of
important votes in the Convention[,] . . . is more nearly the author of the Constitution of 1787
than any other man”).
47. Both Washington and Madison referred to the events at Philadelphia as a “miracle,”
and Catherine Drinker Bowen used “Miracle at Philadelphia” as the title of her well-known
account of the Constitutional Convention. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT
PHILADELPHIA, at ix (1966).
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Miracle at Philadelphia, however, would have no enduring impact
unless leading states, including New York, joined in ratification. So as
the autumn of 1787 moved toward winter, Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay put their shoulders to the wheel. The Federalist No. 1, written by
Hamilton, appeared on October 27. Jay contributed Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5
in a period that spanned October 31 to November 10. Madison’s first
contribution—the justly famous The Federalist No. 10—was published
48
on November 22. By the time Publius surrendered to exhaustion in
May of 1788, seventy-seven separate essays had made their
appearance in New York newspapers and eight more had surfaced in
the book version of Publius’s work.
Despite these efforts, word on the street in early 1788 indicated
that ratification in New York was doubtful. America’s spiraling
struggles under the Articles of Confederation, however, gave
49
Hamilton and his collaborators cause for hope. The essential
problem was well known: the Articles of Confederation vested the
central government with so little power that the states operated much
50
like independent nations. In theory, the federal Congress could
wage war, make treaties, and conduct relations with Native American
tribes. But the Articles sapped these powers of energy by denying
Congress the authority to raise an army on its own or to impose taxes
51
directly on American citizens. Instead, the federal government could
gather funds and troops only by demanding contributions from the
52
states, which often hesitated to comply. This system of “quotas” and
“requisitions” produced a steady stream of budget shortfalls and

48. Jacob E. Cooke, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at xi, xiii (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
49. For major treatments of this period in addition to FISKE, supra note 15, see MERRILL
JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION, 1781–1789 (1950), MORRIS, supra note 16, and JACK N. RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS (1979). A useful bibliography appears in MORRIS, supra, at 263–67.
50. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787, at 356–57 (1993) (noting that the states exercised even powers forbidden by the Articles of
Confederation). Notably, the Articles of Confederation reserved to the states “every power,
jurisdiction, and right . . . not . . . expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled” and did not expressly delegate the Confederation Congress many of the powers the
present-day Congress possesses, including the powers to lay taxes and to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
51. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
52. See BOWEN, supra note 47, at 5 (noting that “[t]he Confederation . . . had no power to
collect taxes [or] defend the country” and “[o]ften enough there was no response” to Congress’s
requisitions for money).
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escalating aggravation among citizens throughout the nation. In
particular, the defaults of some states in meeting their obligations
54
bred animosities—and further defaults—on the part of other states.
Because of these conditions, Hamilton could observe in The
Federalist No. 30 that “the government of the Union has gradually
55
dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation.”
By 1787, many citizens shared his view that the federal government’s
“radical vice” of a wholesale dependence on the states had brought
56
America to the “last stage of national humiliation.”
Problems related to commerce also plagued the Confederation.
The central government’s inability to impose taxes left it hard-pressed
to deal with an ever-mounting debt that had grown out of the
57
Revolution. To make matters worse, the states created a dizzying
58
array of currencies that experienced sharp shifts in valuation, thus
59
spawning economic uncertainty and loss. Meanwhile, states through
which commercial traffic flowed enacted self-serving legislation that
60
burdened neighboring jurisdictions. These problems cried out for
national solutions. Federal authorities were eager to act. The
government created by the Articles of Confederation was so feckless,
53. Hamilton knew particularly well the difficulties of the requisition system. On October
1, 1787, and twice thereafter, the following notice appeared in the New York Packet: “THE
SUBSCRIBER has received nothing on account of the quota of this State for the present year.
(Signed) ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Receiver of Continental Taxes.” Id. The situation in other
states was doubtless worse, as New York assertedly paid a greater proportion of what the
congress requested than did any other state in the post-Revolution years. See DE PAUW, supra
note 17, at 10 (“When peace returned and the collection of taxes improved, New York paid a
larger percentage of her Congressional requisitions than did any other State.”).
54. See BOWEN, supra note 47, at 5 (“The states which paid were bitter against the states
which did not, and said so.”).
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 188; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 91 (adding that “[t]here is scarcely
any thing that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which
we do not experience”).
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 93.
57. See FISKE, supra note 15, at 104–05 (describing Congress’s failure to produce income
and the resultant loss of creditworthiness); MORRIS, supra note 16, at 124–25 (detailing amounts
of budget shortfalls).
58. See FISKE, supra note 15, at 171 (noting that the existence of “different kinds of paper
created such a labyrinth as no human intellect could explore”).
59. See id. at 176 (noting that one dollar of paper money in Rhode Island issued in May
1786 was only worth sixteen cents by November of that year).
60. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 19, at 228 (describing the effects of New York’s impost
system upon neighboring states); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note
14, at 283 (describing the need for “relief of the States which import and export through other
States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter”).
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however, that it lacked even the nominal power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce.
One instance of failed reform demonstrates pointedly the
ineffectiveness of the government under the Articles of
Confederation. In 1782, a fiscal crisis triggered support from twelve
separate states for letting Congress lay duties directly on importers.
Tiny Rhode Island, however, held out. The other states had
conditioned their approval of the plan on unanimous support, in
keeping with the rule that amendments to the Articles of
Confederation required each state’s consent, so that Rhode Island’s
61
rejection operated as an effective veto. That a state occupied by less
than two percent of the nation’s people could block a measure so
widely endorsed and so greatly needed struck most Americans as the
62
height of folly.
Perhaps it was poetic justice that the greatest economic crisis of
the preconstitutional period reared its head in the same state that
stubbornly resisted reform efforts designed to bolster the nation’s
fiscal powers. Rhode Island, like other states, experienced intense
63
controversies over the issuance of paper money during the 1780s.
Creditors opposed this medium of payment because it lacked
inherent value. Debtors, however, saw things differently. They
pressed state governments to print paper money, to assign it a fixed
value, and to distribute it in sufficient volumes to provide a soft64
money medium for paying off hard-money loans. Debtors also
encouraged legislators to pass so-called “stay laws,” which delayed
the ability of creditors to collect debts even after they had fully
65
matured.

61. See DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 33.
62. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 140
(lamenting the system under which “[a] sixtieth part of the Union . . . has several times been
able to oppose an intire bar to its operations”).
63. FISKE, supra note 15, at 173.
64. See id. at 174 (discussing efforts to use “promissory notes of a bankrupt government” to
pay “real money” debts). Some modern historians have been more charitable toward the
proponents of paper money. See, e.g., PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE
ISLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1776–1841, at 88 (1977) (arguing that the “real
motives . . . were tax relief and reduction of the state debt”); id. at 89 (arguing that “the paper
plan must be considered a success”).
65. See 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 228–41 (3d ed., New York, D. Appleton 1883) (describing
laws interfering with contracts in several states, including stay laws).
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Many Americans, especially in the propertied classes, saw grave
danger in debtor-relief laws and quick-fix paper money schemes. In
Rhode Island, however, a “debtor party” captured the statehouse and
proceeded to implement aggressive reforms. In particular, the
legislature permitted the printing of vast amounts of new currency—
more dollars per person than in any other state—and then it forced
66
creditors to take the currency in payment of past debts at face value.
In addition, Rhode Island laid heavy fines on merchants who rejected
payment in currency and also went so far as to strip persons charged
67
with this offense of the benefit of trial by jury. These moves
triggered turmoil in Rhode Island and beyond, particularly among
nonresidents who had lent money to Rhode Island borrowers.
Mounting resentments raised concerns that commercial antagonisms
68
soon might give way to interstate conflicts of a bloodier kind.
The threat of armed hostilities was not without substance. In the
winter of 1783, the Continental Army was encamped in Newburgh,
New York, where officers fumed about the federal government’s
wavering on whether to honor debts owed to Revolutionary War
69
veterans. Frustrations boiled over into open talk of marching on
Congress, and fliers advocating just that course of action began to
circulate in camp. With a dramatic speech, General Washington
70
quelled the gathering tempest. Three months later, however,
another band of embittered troops did march on Philadelphia all the
way from western Pennsylvania. Once in town, these mutineers
ransacked local arsenals and surrounded Independence Hall. Again,
local authorities put down the threat of violence, but not before

66. GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 260 (1984).
67. CONLEY, supra note 64, at 90. The highest court of Rhode Island refused to enforce the
law stripping defendants of the right to a jury trial. As Patrick T. Conley has pointed out, the
formal reason given was that the court lacked jurisdiction, but the state legislature and many
historians interpreted the court’s action as declaring the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 95–96.
68. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 42
(cautioning that wars may result from “[l]aws in violation of private contracts as they amount to
aggressions on the rights of those States, whose citizens are injured by them”); see also id. at 39
(counting “[t]he competitions of commerce” among the states as a “fruitful source of
contention”).
69. On the so-called Newburgh Conspiracy, and the events leading up to it, see MORRIS,
supra note 16, at 127–33.
70. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 178–79 (“The mutinous soldiers, inexpressibly moved, were
shamed by their opposition to Washington and restored to their senses.”).
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Congress had taken leave of Pennsylvania to seek protection from
71
New Jersey’s presumably more reliable militia.
Risks of armed conflict with foreign powers also threatened the
infant nation. Britain, which was outraged by American refusals to
pay off English creditors as required by the Revolution-concluding
Treaty of Paris, ignored its own obligations to abandon forts in the
sparsely populated Northwest and fomented Native American attacks
72
on settlers in that region. Meanwhile, Spain, which controlled the
lower stretch of the Mississippi, blocked American navigation of the
river and waited for settlers in present-day Kentucky and Tennessee
“to abandon their feeble Congress for the solid commercial
73
advantage of Spanish citizenship.”
The forces of turbulence took their most troubling turn during
1786 in western Massachusetts. There, a crisis arose after
conservatives in the Boston statehouse adopted a policy of paying off
war debts in hard currency, a choice that imposed severe hardships on
farmers and the poor, as taxes rose and money supplies tightened. As
a result, an armed band of disillusioned locals under the leadership of
74
Daniel Shays marched on a county courthouse, demanding relief.
75
The uprising was quickly put down. News of Shays’s Rebellion,
76
however, gripped a fearful nation. Rhode Island’s radical paper
71. Id. at 180, 181–82.
72. Id. at 394; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
141 (2005) (noting that Britain retained five forts within New York, “thereby blocking free
access to the lucrative fur trade and complicating American relations with Indian tribes in the
region”).
73. JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 121 (3d ed. 1973). Nor were the
Spanish mere passive observers in seeking to induce American secession in favor of Spanish
rule. As noted by Professor Morris: “James Wilkinson, as unsavory a character as bestrode the
Western scene, a man given to lying, bullying, or fawning as circumstances dictated, devoted
himself to the task of separating Kentucky from Virginia in order to turn it over to Spain, for
whom he served as a secret agent.” MORRIS, supra note 16, at 124.
74. E.g., FISKE, supra note 15, at 180. The Shays brigade also went after guns at an arsenal
in Springfield, Massachusetts. Upon being told that the weapons stored there belonged to the
federal government, Shays offered a telling response: “To hell with Congress! That crowd is too
weak to act.” MORRIS, supra note 16, at 173.
75. See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 15, at 182–83 (“A few minutes sufficed to scatter [Shays’s
men] in flight.”).
76. The impact of the uprising was heightened because it did not stand alone. As Professor
Morris has written:
[B]ackcountry resistance to debt and tax collection was a contagion that spread from
New England to pockets of law defiance evident from New Jersey to South Carolina.
In June of 1786 “a tumultuous assemblage of the people” closed down Maryland’s
Charles County courthouse, and boycotts against the sale of debtor property were
spreading rapidly in other parts of Maryland. In South Carolina, farmers attacked the
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money reforms had revealed the potential excesses of localized
democracy. Shays’s Rebellion raised the more ominous specter that
the new nation stood on the precipice of anarchy.
It was in this context that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay undertook
to make the case for ratification in The Federalist Papers. Just how
they made their case for ratification is considered in Part II.
II. THE ARGUMENT OF PUBLIUS
A modern observer might well suppose that ratification of the
Constitution was a sure bet under the difficult conditions of late 1787.
That, however, is far from true. Both before and after the
Philadelphia Convention, there was broad agreement that
proliferating problems under the Articles of Confederation called for
a more vigorous central government. There was massive
disagreement, however, about the way in which that government
77
should be structured. In particular, many feared that the newly
proposed Constitution would bring about such a dramatic shift from
state to national power that Americans soon would labor under the
yoke of a distant and unresponsive consolidated government. As one
antifederalist (who, with a touch of irony, called himself “A
Federalist”) observed: “I had rather be a free citizen of the small
republic of Massachusetts, than an oppressed subject of the great
78
American empire.”
Critics also hurled dozens of specific objections at the handiwork
of the Convention. Was it not clear that an aristocracy would grow

Camden courthouse and sent the judges scurrying home. In Virginia . . . . [i]n May of
1787 a mob burned down the King William County courthouse, destroying all the
records, and court proceedings were blocked in other county courts as well.
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 176.
77. See, e.g., Impartial Examiner V, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 18, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 197, 199 (agreeing that “the Congress are not
invested with sufficient powers for regulating commerce, and procuring the requisite
contributions . . . for the common defence or general welfare” but seeing “no necessity for an
innovation further than strengthening [the Congress]” because of fear “that no security for . . .
liberties will remain after [the Constitution’s] adoption”); AN OLD WHIG IV, PHILA. INDEP.
GAZETTEER, Oct. 1787–Feb. 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 18, at 30, 30–34 (asserting that “experience seems to have convinced every one, that the
articles of confederation . . . are insufficient for the purposes intended” but objecting to the
Constitution on the ground that the resulting federal republic would be too large to function
effectively).
78. A Federalist, BOSTON GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 117, 118.
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out of a Senate made up of a mere twenty-six members elected to sixyear terms? Was not a House of Representatives with only sixty-five
members too small to produce meaningful connections between
elected legislators and their constituents? Would not the absence of
restrictions on presidential re-election inevitably lead to the
emergence of a de facto monarch? And why on earth did the
Constitution omit a Bill of Rights? These were fair challenges, and
critiques of this sort found expression in hundreds of writings
unleashed by furious antifederalists. With the proposal of the
Philadelphia Convention, like so much in life, the devil was in the
details. And many citizens preferred the devil they knew over the
devil they did not.
As the authors of The Federalist surveyed this scene, they sought
a rhetoric suited to the purpose at hand. The essays would have to
speak of enduring themes, and they did so. At bottom, however, the
tracts were campaign literature. As a result, The Federalist delivered a
partisan argument, and that argument did not draw its greatest
strength from appeals to lofty abstractions. Instead its force came
from a web of persuasion spun from history, emotion, shared
concerns, and common sense, all woven together to capture the
support of New Yorkers in 1787 and 1788.
The whole of The Federalist exceeded the sum of its parts. Still,
the parts were important, and critical components of the case made
by Publius built on (1) the characteristics and desires of the local
audience; (2) history and accepted practice; (3) practical reasoning;
(4) imagery and metaphor; (5) openness to compromise; and (6)
emotional responses, including responses inspired by America’s
revolutionary tradition.
A. Attending to the Audience
Because Hamilton, Madison, and Jay wrote The Federalist for
newspapers, they trained their sights on local readers—shopkeepers
and shippers, farmers and merchants, the wealthy and the middle
class, the cautious and the bold. Among these readers lurked
concerns of all sorts, from theoretical scruples held by politically
minded intellectuals to bottom-line fears of business owners faced
79
with the prospect of dual taxation. The fortunes of many men—

79. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 227–29
(noting concerns over double taxation).
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particularly local political figures who faced “diminution of the
power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under
80
the State-establishments”—hung in the balance.
Hamilton took heed of these forces as he charted the direction of
the essays. In The Federalist No. 1, he worried openly that “[t]he plan
offered to our deliberations, affects too many particular interests,
innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its
discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,
81
passions and prejudices little favourable to the discovery of truth.”
He also perceived that pulls against ratification were both
82
“numerous” and “powerful” even for “wise and good men.” As a
result, Publius set out to “determine clearly and fully the merits of
this Constitution,” a task that would involve “examining it on all its
sides; comparing it in all its parts, and calculating its probable
83
effects.” In short, the Federalist Papers would be long. The authors
would strive to give “a satisfactory answer to all the objections which
shall have made their appearance that may seem to have any claim
84
to . . . attention.” The argument of Publius, however, would offer
more than a series of counterpunches. Spread through the text would
be affirmative appeals to the interests and concerns of a diverse and
skeptical audience situated in 1787 in the state of New York.
In keeping with their purpose, the authors of The Federalist
focused attention on shared worries of their time and place. Talk of

80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 4.
81. Id. Madison expressed much the same thought in No. 37:
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely
investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their
real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt
to be diminished than prompted, by those occasions which require an unusual
exercise of it.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 231.
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 4.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 231. Meticulous attention
was necessary, Madison added, because “the act of the Convention . . . recommends so many
important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and
which touches the springs of so many passions and interests.” Id. at 231–32. Hamilton worried
that such a painstaking treatment might at times prove “tedious and irksome” to readers. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 90. The cost was worth the price,
however, because the project addressed “a subject . . . most momentous” and was complicated
by “the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way.” Id.
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 7 (emphasis added).
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Rhode Island’s intransigence, interstate trade conflicts, and Shays’s
87
Rebellion made frequent appearances in the essays. The writers
drew on the fears of their day. In particular, The Federalist reminded
readers at every turn that a failure to adopt the Constitution meant
retaining the Articles of Confederation, under which a “melancholy
88
situation” had taken hold.
The argument of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay appealed to
different voting blocs. They targeted prospective borrowers,
emphasizing that credit had been “reduced within the narrowest
limits” due to an “opinion of insecurity” born of a weak central
89
government. They pleaded for the support of urban property
owners, arguing that the depressed “price of improved land . . . can
only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence,
which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks and which have a
90
direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind.” For patrons
of frugality, Hamilton devoted a full essay to detailing why the
Constitution promised economies of scale that made cost-based
91
objections “appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.”
Manufacturers and planters needed a strong union to supply “a
flourishing marine”; otherwise a dependence on foreign carriers

85. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 42–43 (“We
have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut, in consequence of the
enormities perpetrated by the legislature of Rhode-Island . . . .”)
86. See id. at 39–40 (noting that, left unchecked, states would tend to pursue trade policies
to their own benefit and the detriment of their neighbors); THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 71–72 (advocating a uniform interstate trade system); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 135–37 (same); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 283–85 (same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James
Madison), supra note 14, at 314 (same).
87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 31, 35 (cautioning
that uprisings like Shays’s Rebellion could have dangerous consequences for the republic); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 131 (same); THE FEDERALIST NO.
28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 177 (same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 502 (same).
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 92.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 74
(noting that it had been “found, in various countries, that in proportion as commerce has
flourished, land has risen in value”).
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 13 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 82. Indeed,
Hamilton supplemented his extensive discussion of this subject in No. 13 with a further
treatment in No. 84. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 587
(concluding that “the sources of additional expence from the establishment of the proposed
constitution are much fewer than may have been imagined”).
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would compel us “to content ourselves with the first price of our
commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to
92
enrich our enemies and persecutors.” Why should fishermen—
whose “spirit of enterprise” had rendered them “able to undersell
[European] nations in their own markets”—support the
93
Constitution? Because without a government energetic enough to
negotiate fair treaties with foreign powers, nothing would be “more
natural, than that they should be disposed to exclude . . . such
94
dangerous competitors” from the grant of local trading privileges.
Time and again, Publius appealed to special concerns of the New
York audience. Equal representation of the states in the proposed
Senate, for example, might rankle residents of large and fast-growing
New York. Hamilton emphasized in The Federalist No. 22, however,
that the system adopted by the Philadelphia Convention, which
paired the Senate with a House apportioned solely on the basis of
population, improved on the existing system, under which each
95
state—no matter what its size—had only one vote. In The Federalist
No. 35, Hamilton observed that alternative constitutional proposals
would deny Congress the power of general taxation and instead
permit only the imposition of duties on imports from foreign
96
countries. “New-York,” he added, “is an importing State, and is not
likely speedily to be to any great extent a manufacturing State. She
would of course suffer in a double light from restraining the
97
jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.” In The Federalist
No. 41, Madison noted that New York faced special dangers because
its “sea coast is extensive” and it “is penetrated by a large navigable
98
river for more than fifty leagues.” Resulting vulnerabilities to naval
assault—much heightened by “the precarious situation of European
affairs”—made New York a likely future “hostage, for ignominous
compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the
99
rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians.” Safety in these
circumstances could come only from a strong federal navy. But “[i]n

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 69.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 70.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 138–39.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 216–18.
Id. at 217.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 275.
Id.
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the present condition of America, the states more immediately
exposed to these calamities, have nothing to hope from the phantom
100
of a general government which now exists.”
In The Federalist No. 25, Hamilton shifted his attention to
northern New York, pointing to his state’s shared border with
English-occupied Canada. Danger from British armies confronted all
the states, but New York was “more directly exposed,” and a
continuing drift toward disunity would require it to bear the full cost
101
of border-area fortifications. “Upon the plan of separate provisions,
New-York would have to sustain the whole weight of the
establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate
102
or ultimate protection of her neighbours.” Such a system, Hamilton
103
observed, would not be “safe as it respected the other States.” Even
more important, it would not be “equitable as it respected New104
York.”
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay also sought to cultivate the support
of their audience by plying their readers with compliments. Publius
105
praised “the present genius of the people,” whom he described as
106
107
“considerate and virtuous,” “candid and judicious,” “impartial
108
109
and discerning,” and “intelligent and well informed.” The “gallant
citizens of America,” for example, would never acquiesce in the use
110
of federal armies to overthrow legitimate state authorities. New

100. Id.
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 158. Nor was an
exposure to foreign invaders of only theoretical interest to New Yorkers in the 1780s. As
Professor Wright explained:
In a city that had been occupied by British forces for almost seven years during the
Revolution (longer than any other city) and in a state that was the site for major
battles and whose northern and western frontiers had suffered from British armies
and Indian raids, it was scarcely necessary to underline the point that war is
unpleasant. Moreover, five of the posts that England had not given up, but had
continued to occupy in violation of the Treaty of 1783, were in New York State.
Wright, supra note 46, at 18.
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 158.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 375.
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 57.
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 230.
108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 148.
109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 13.
110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 322.
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Yorkers were “little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery.”
The very institution of republican self-government revealed that there
112
exists no small “portion of virtue and honor among mankind.”
Rhetoric of this kind created tension with those parts of The
Federalist that emphasized the need to fashion government to the
shortcomings of human nature, and steering a course between these
competing ideas took some artful maneuvering. Publius met the
challenge primarily by stressing the difference between political
leaders and the general citizenry. Without question, some
Americans—especially those drawn to public office—would embrace
113
a “love of power” and prove “capable of preferring their own
114
emolument and advancement to the public weal.” Among ordinary
citizens, however, the great danger came not from malevolence or
unchecked self-centeredness, but from “temporary errors and
115
delusions.” Thus, “people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD,”
116
and “[t]his often applies to their very errors.” The difficulty, as
Madison explained in The Federalist No. 63, came from “particular
moments in public affairs, when the people stimulated by some
irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful
misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
117
condemn.” It was no insult to recognize these conditions because
even the most praiseworthy citizens “know from experience, that they

111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 424–25; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 340–41 (noting “the success . . . which
does so much honour to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America”).
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 514; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 378 (arguing that “[w]ere the pictures
which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the
human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for selfgovernment; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from
destroying and devouring one another”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note
14, at 386 (noting that “the universal and extreme indignation which [ingratitude] inspires, is
itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment”).
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 97.
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 402. Indeed,
government service would always attract “a few aspiring characters” who seek to abuse power
to their own “subversive” ends. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, at
386. And in almost any individual representative, some “motives of a . . . selfish nature” would
operate, including “pride and vanity.” Id.
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425.
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 482.
117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425.
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118

sometimes err.” Indeed (and here Publius reached the apex of
playing both sides of the table), “the wonder is, that they so seldom
err as they do; beset as they continually are by the wiles of parasites
and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the
desperate; by the artifices of men, who possess their confidence more
119
than they deserve it.” Publius appealed to the “accuracy and
120
121
candour” and the “cool and deliberate sense” of the broader
community in urging ratification. Human frailty would come into play
as citizens grappled with the Constitution because “there is a degree
of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of
122
circumspection and distrust.” There were, however, also “other
qualities in human nature,” and Publius argued that the idea of selfgovernment reflects confidence that human virtue was sufficient, in
the absence of tyranny, to “restrain [citizens] from destroying and
123
devouring one another.” After all, “the people of any country . . .
seldom adopt, [or] steadily persevere for many years in, an erroneous
124
opinion respecting their interests.” It was largely in this way that a
frequent depiction of the citizenry as virtuous and wise comported
with Publius’s simultaneous calls for extreme caution in shaping the
structures of republican self-rule.

118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 482.
119. Id. But cf. Wright, supra note 46, at 83 (asserting that Publius does not “fall back on the
common and unfortunate view that politicians are less virtuous than private citizens”).
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 314.
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425.
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 378; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 35 (noting that people “are yet
remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue”).
123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 378; see THE FEDERALIST
NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 513–14 (claiming that “[t]he supposition of
universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning than the
supposition of universal rectitude”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14,
at 385 (noting that “[t]here is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem,
and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful
and benevolent returns”); see also Wright, supra note 46, at 79–80 (drawing on Professor
Scanlon’s work in asserting that Publius’s “method of ‘reasoned discourse’” reflected the
assumption “that his readers could be helped to see beyond their immediate prejudices and
even beyond their local or personal, but still immediate, self-interest and to decide on the basis
of what may be termed a long-run view of their interests”); see also id. at 14 (“The authors of
The Federalist did not . . . hold a romantic view of the nature of man, but they were influenced
by the Age of Reason to the extent of believing that man’s reason was adequate to the task of
devising satisfactory political institutions, provided continuity with past experience in
government was maintained.”).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 13.
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B. The Case from History
Appeals to history complemented The Federalist’s focus on the
interests of New York readers. Over and over, Madison emphasized
125
that “[e]xperience is the oracle of truth” and “the guide that ought
126
always to be followed.” Hamilton likewise saw history as “the
127
parent of wisdom”
and “the least fallible guide of human
128
opinions.” More than 100 years later, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
would declare that “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
129
experience.”
Publius held the same view, maintaining in The
Federalist No. 43 that “theoretic reasoning . . . must be qualified by
130
the lessons of practice.” These words reflected an outlook of deep
significance to the three authors of The Federalist, for each of them
was an insatiable student of history. Madison, for example, had
immersed himself in the study of past governments throughout the
131
months preceding the Constitutional Convention, and Hamilton’s
132
and Jay’s investigations of history were little less impressive.
Lessons gleaned from historical research pervaded The Federalist,
reaching from Greek and Roman history through British experience
to the recent experiments with government of the American states.
1. The Ancients. At the heart of The Federalist’s treatment of
history—especially in Nos. 19 and 20—were sobering depictions of

125.
126.
127.
128.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 128.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 355.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 490.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; accord THE
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 96 (describing history as the “best
oracle of wisdom”).
129. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1881).
130. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 293.
131. See, e.g., KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 183–85 (describing Madison’s exhaustive study of
the history of federated governments during the spring and summer of 1786).
132. See CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 24 (noting “Hamilton’s omnivorous, self-directed
reading”); id. at 52 (recounting that Hamilton “ransacked the library” while in college in his
studies of philosophy and law); id. at 110–12 (explaining how Hamilton “constantly educated
himself” during the war, spitting out 112 pages of notes from readings ranging from Bacon to
Postlethwayt to Plutarch); id. at 137 (noting that “[i]n his spare time, Hamilton pored over
financial treatises”); id. at 206 (noting that “Hamilton read widely and accumulated books
insatiably” in the post-Revolution period and that he “never stopped pondering the ancients”).
Jay attended King’s College in New York City beginning in 1760 (at the age of fourteen) and
there encountered the classical histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as the legal
theories of Grotius. WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY 9–11 (2005).
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republics and confederacies of the distant past. Tracking thendominant traditions of classical learning, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay
133
134
135
laced their essays with allusions to Athens, Sparta, Thebes, the
136
Achaean League of ancient Greece, and the Lycian League of Asia
137
138
139
Minor. There were treatments of Rome, Carthage, and more
140
modern European experiments in government. Careful attention
141
142
was paid to the United Netherlands, Swiss cantons, postfeudal
143
144
German alliances, and the legislature of Poland.

133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 29, 32; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 110–17; THE FEDERALIST NO. 25
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 163; THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra
note 14, at 240–41; THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 374; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425, 427.
134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; THE FEDERALIST
NO. 18 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 110–17; THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison),
supra note 14, at 426.
135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 111, 113.
136. Id. at 113; THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 240–41; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 310; THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 473.
137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 55–56; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 310.
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 27; THE FEDERALIST NO. 6
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 14, at 209–10; THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 240–41;
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 271; THE FEDERALIST NO. 63
(James Madison), supra note 14, at 426, 428; THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 14, at 471–80.
139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; THE FEDERALIST
NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 426–27.
140. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 152
(observing that the antifederalist objection to standing armies in times of peace was “in
contradiction to the practice of other free nations”).
141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 33; THE FEDERALIST
NO. 20 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 124–27; THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison),
supra note 14, at 250; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 284; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 291–92; THE FEDERALIST NO. 75
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 508.
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 122–23; THE FEDERALIST
NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 284; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison),
supra note 14, at 292–93.
143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 74; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 86; THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (James
Madison), supra note 14, at 117–20; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note
14, at 137; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 284; THE FEDERALIST
NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 292; THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 536–37.
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Hellenic experience laid waste to the notion—central to the
philosophy underlying the Articles of Confederation—that
confederated governments could direct legislative commands only at
member states, rather than at individuals. Indeed,
of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has handed down
to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain
vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters of
that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best
deserved, and have most liberally received the applauding suffrages
145
of political writers.

In particular, the experiences of Lycia and Achaea revealed that a
confederated government could hold the power to regulate
individuals without destroying the sovereignty of confederacy
members. “[H]istory does not inform us,” Madison wrote, “that either
of them ever degenerated or tended to degenerate into one
146
consolidated government.”
Rome’s experiments also offered important lessons of which the
Constitution’s drafters had taken proper heed. Was it advisable to
require the ratification of treaties by two-thirds of the whole
membership of the Senate, rather than two-thirds of those present to
vote? Such an approach might require de facto unanimity among
those in attendance, and “the examples of the Roman tribuneship”
revealed the “impotence, perplexity and disorder” that would result
147
from this form of legislative sign-off. Would it not be wise to
commit the executive power to more than a single person? “Roman
history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the
148
dissentions between the consuls . . . .” Despite these dangers, might
there not be offsetting gains in keeping the executive power out of the
hands of just one officer? Rome “gives us no specimens of any
peculiar advantages derived to the state, from the circumstance of the
149
plurality of those magistrates.”

144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 86; THE FEDERALIST NO.
19 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 122; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 14, at 140; THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 251; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 508.
145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 99.
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 310.
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 508.
148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 473.
149. Id.
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2. British Practice.
The authors of The Federalist often
consulted British history, emphasizing that it “presents to
150
mankind . . . many political lessons.” As to the Constitution’s closer
bonding of the states, the successful integration of England, Scotland,
151
and Wales provided a model for America to follow. It was enough
to say in defense of the Intellectual Property Clause that the “copy
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a
152
right at common law.” As to the lifetime appointments of judges,
“[t]he experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on
153
the excellence of the institution.” British practice also supported the
Constitution’s division of power between House and Senate in
impeachment proceedings. After all, “[i]n Great Britain, it is the
province of the house of commons to prefer the impeachment; and of
154
the house of lords to decide upon it.”
One high-visibility debate between federalists and antifederalists
elicited from Publius a particularly close examination of British
history. Critics of the Constitution had assailed its provision for twoyear House terms by invoking a favorite slogan of the day—“that
155
where annual elections end, tyranny begins.”
For Madison,
however, “the degree of liberty retained even under septennial
elections” in Great Britain left no doubt that two-year terms
156
presented no danger of oppression. Indeed, even during its most
republican episodes, Britain provided for elections no more frequent
157
than once every three years.
In similar fashion, the history of the mother country undercut
widely voiced concerns about recognition of a congressional power to

150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 382.
151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 23–24.
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 288.
153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 530.
154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 440. British
experience also undercut complaints that a four-year term for the president was so lengthy that
it would lead to executive domination of the legislative branch. After all:
If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings . . . have by rapid
strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the privileges of the nobility . . .
while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the
Legislature . . . what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years
duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States?
THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 485–86.
155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 359.
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 356.
157. Id.
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158

maintain a standing army. Following the defeat of King James II in
the Glorious Revolution, after all, the drafters of the English Bill of
Rights had provided for keeping military forces in service “with the
159
consent of parliament.” Thus even “when the pulse of liberty was at
its highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was
thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept
160
up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate.” It was a
telling point that, on this score, “[t]he patriots, who effected that
memorable revolution, were too temperate and too well informed, to
161
think of any restraint in the legislative discretion.”
3. State Experience.
Publius bolstered his argument for
ratification by citing American, as well as British, history. Arguments
from state practice drew in part on the experiences of dysfunctional
institutions. Exclusive federal regulation of the currency, for example,
found support in “the pestilent effects of paper money” circulated by
states whose “guilt . . . can be expiated [not] otherwise than by a
voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been
162
the instrument of it.” Rhode Island’s past obstinacy in resisting
reform of the federal taxing power supported “an irresistible
conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of 12 States, to the
perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth” in the constitutional
163
amendment process. Thus the Constitution properly required assent
by only three-fourths of the states to amendments duly proposed by
Congress.
In some instances, the essayists drew on state practice to craft a
164
fortiori arguments in support of the Constitution. In response to the
contention that two-year House terms were too lengthy, for example,
Madison pointed to the history of his own state. Although Virginia
had provided for seven-year election cycles at the time of the

158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 165–66.
159. Id. at 166.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 300.
163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 263.
164. Notably, in just the first fifty-two pages of his classic treatment of The Federalist, Garry
Wills happens upon at least three a fortiori arguments based on state or British practice. See
WILLS, supra note 28, at 43–44 (regarding the Constitution’s ratio of representatives to
constituents); id. at 44 (regarding corruptibility and unresponsiveness of legislators); id. at 52
(regarding the acceptability of imprecise limits on government powers).
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Revolution, “the colony . . . stood first in resisting the parliamentary
usurpations of Great-Britain,” and “it was the first also in espousing
165
by public act, the resolution of independence.” It followed from
Virginia’s experience with septennial elections “that the liberties of
166
the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.” The case
for two-year terms found support in another recent piece of state-side
history as well: the “iniquitous measures” propounded in Rhode
Island to protect local debtors had come from legislators who had
167
stood for election at six-month intervals.
Publius repeatedly argued that what was good for the local goose
should be good for the federal gander. Critics of the Constitution, for
example, complained that it would permit the federal government to
impose poll taxes. Hamilton retorted:
Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind . . . .
Are the State governments to be stigmatised as tyrannies because
they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety can the
like power justify such a charge against the national government, or
168
even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption?

Some antifederalists questioned the wisdom of lifetime appointments
169
but Publius defended this approach as
for federal judges,
170
“conformable to the most approved of the state constitutions.”
Some critics decried the Constitution’s blending of functions among

165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 358.
166. Id.
167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 423; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 360 (observing that, despite each state’s
half-year terms of legislative office, “it would not be easy to shew that Connecticut or RhodeIsland is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty than South-Carolina,”
which had two-year terms). Even proposed rules that seemed inconsistent with state practice
could be made to look appealing through the creative logic of Publius. In The Federalist No. 39,
Madison brushed aside attacks on six-year terms for senators even though not one state in 1787
tolerated legislative service of this duration. AMAR, supra note 72, at 75 (noting that no state
senate term exceeded five years). A six-year term, Madison reasoned, is “but one year more
than the period of the Senate of Maryland; and but two more than that of the Senates of NewYork and Virginia.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 252. Because
the experience of those states had been distinctively positive, it followed that the six-year term
would be present no difficulties. Id.
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 229.
169. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 522 (noting that
this provision had “been drawn into question by the adversaries of [the] plan”).
170. Id.
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171

the three branches of government. “If we look into the constitutions
of the several states,” Madison replied, “we find that . . . there is not a
single instance in which the several departments of power have been
172
kept absolutely separate and distinct.” Responding to attacks on the
congressional power to maintain a standing army, Hamilton noted
that the framers’ proposed treatment of this subject corresponded “to
the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing
173
constitutions.”
Publius had to walk a tightrope in relying on state constitutional
practice because he was not, by his own admission, “an advocate for
174
the particular organizations of the several state governments,”
whose constitutions bore “strong marks of the haste, and still stronger
175
of the inexperience, under which they were framed.” Even so, those
constitutions exemplified “many excellent principles” that the
176
Philadelphia Convention had honored. At the least, these charters
revealed that few features of the new Constitution reflected wholesale
innovations.
4. New York.
At the outset of the project, Hamilton
emphasized to New Yorkers the “analogy to your own state
177
constitution” of the proposed federal charter. Had the framers
erred in failing to set a date for congressional and senatorial
elections? If so, “it may be asked, why was not a time for the like
178
purpose fixed” in New York’s Constitution? Was it wrong to let a

171. See, e.g., Brutus XIV, N.Y. J., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 442, 446 (asserting that “a branch of the legislature should not be
invested with the power of appointing officers” and that “[t]his power in the senate is very
improperly lodged for a number of reasons”); Cato V, N.Y. J., Sept. 1787–Jan. 1788, reprinted in
2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 116, 118 (decrying the Senate’s role in
appointments, impeachment trials, and treaty ratification).
172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 327.
173. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 152. Pointing to a
particularly familiar episode of recent history, he added that the Revolution showed that state
militias alone could not defend the nation; rather, a “regular and disciplined army” was
required. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 162.
174. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 331.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 7 (emphasis omitted).
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 414. The answer to
this question, Hamilton continued, was that this “was a matter which might safely be entrusted
to legislative discretion, and that if a time had been appointed, it might upon experiment have
been found less convenient than some other time.” Id.
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president seek re-election? The governor of New York could seek
179
new terms of office “without limitation or intermission.” Did the
new Constitution create House districts too populous to allow voters
to cast ballots wisely? “[T]he members of [the State] Assembly, for
the cities and counties of New-York and Albany, are elected by very
nearly as many voters, as will be entitled to a representative in the
180
Congress . . . .” In The Federalist No. 69, Hamilton compared the
prerogatives of the president to those of the governor of New York
(as well as governors of other states and the King of England). This
analysis ranged across the veto, military, pardon, legislativeadjournment, and appointment powers. After putting the distinctively
national matter of treaty-making by the president to one side,
Hamilton concluded that “it would be difficult to determine whether
that Magistrate . . . possess[es] more or less power than the Governor
181
Some antifederalists argued that a proper
of New-York.”
182
constitution would provide for polling in each county, yet the New
York Constitution provided for state senate elections “in the great
districts into which the State is or may be divided,” which “at
183
present . . . comprehend each from two to six counties.” Here, as
elsewhere, Publius argued that in comparing the two constitutions “it
184
will be impossible to acquit the one and to condemn the other.”
What’s more, any “similar comparison would lead to the same
conclusion in respect to the Constitutions of most of the other
185
states.”
Reliance on the past practices of New York reflected the
authors’ attentiveness to the nature of their audience. So, too, did the
authors’ insistence that the readers of their essays stood at a turning
point in history. According to Publius, it had fallen to Americans “to
decide . . . whether societies of men are really capable or not, of
186
establishing good government from reflection and choice . . . .”

179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 463.
180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 389.
181. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 469; see also id. at
461–62 (noting that objections to the office and function of the vice president applied equally to
New York’s lieutenant governor, who in similar fashion presided over the senate and assumed
the governorship upon the death of the state’s chief magistrate).
182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 410–11.
183. Id. at 411.
184. Id. at 412.
185. Id.
186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 3.
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With words of this kind, the authors of The Federalist urged their
readers not just to follow history, but to make it. The past had proven
that the Articles of Confederation embodied a clumsy and
shortsighted plan. The Constitution, in contrast, held the promise of
187
creating a form of government “glorious . . . to mankind.”
C. Publius and Practical Reasoning
According to Publius, the capacity of Americans to heed “the
suggestions of their own good sense” was nothing less than “the glory
188
of the people.” Given this outlook, it is not surprising that the
authors of The Federalist often invoked “common sense” in making
189
the case for the Constitution.
Antifederalists, for example, excoriated the Constitution’s
creation of a sweeping congressional taxing power. According to
Publius, however, practical Americans would understand the need for
this power because the United States would “experience a common
portion of the vicissitudes and calamities, which have fallen to the lot
190
of other nations.” Dreamers might see in America’s future only
191
“halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age.” But practical
citizens would prepare for the worst, including the prospect of costly
wars that would present “dangers, to which no possible limits can be
192
assigned.” A new federal government—like any government—
could abuse the taxing power. Madison, however, counted on the
“good sense of the people of America” to perceive that “in every
political institution, a power to advance the public happiness, involves
193
a discretion which may be misapplied.” To be sure, antifederalist

187. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 230.
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88.
189. The term “common sense” appears in THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay), supra note
14, at 24; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 139; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185; THE FEDERALIST NO. 31
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 194; THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 14, at 559, 560; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at
583. The term “good sense” is used in THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note
14, at 87, 88; THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 190; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 268; THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 474; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 14, at 591.
190. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 193.
191. Id.
192. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195–96.
193. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 268–69.
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“rhetoric and declamation . . . may inflame the passions of the
194
unthinking.” Citizens who were “cool and candid,” however, would
see that these critics had “chosen rather to dwell on the
inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political
advantages” to be gained from a much-strengthened federal
195
government.
Common sense combined with common experience to reveal the
flaws of the Articles of Confederation. The Articles, for example,
rested in part on the idea that Congress should direct its commands at
state legislatures (rather than at individuals) because “breaches, by
the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be
196
expected . . . .” But why was that? Logic cut down the notion that a
spirit of rightfulness more often characterizes “bodies of men . . . than
197
individuals”; indeed, groups of persons were in general more
undeserving of trust than particular individuals because concern for
reputation “has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad
198
action is to be divided among a number . . . .” What is more,
common sense suggested that groups of persons who took the form of
a state would be distinctly prone to disobey federal commands
because “there is in the nature of sovereign power an impatience of
controul” that conflicts with the inclination to honor duties owed to a
199
larger confederation.
According to Publius, some antifederalist arguments departed so
200
far from sound reasoning that they qualified as “extravagant.”
Skeptics worried, for example, that a federal power to mobilize local
militias would lead the central government to overwhelm American
liberties. Hamilton’s reply drew on his readers’ personal knowledge
of state militia members:
Where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbours, our fellow-citizens?
What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 269.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185.
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mingling with the rest of their countrymen; and who participate with
201
them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests?

According to Madison, “little critics” had raised a raft of “imaginary”
202
concerns, including the particularly far-fetched suggestion that the
new government might forgo the collection of debts rightfully owed
203
The
to the nation under the Articles of Confederation.
Constitution, Madison acknowledged, did not specify in terms that
obligations owed to the federal government would survive
ratification. But “no real danger can exist that the government would
DARE . . . to remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext
204
here condemned.”
The reasoning of Publius often involved the drawing of
deductions from incontestable principles. Ultimate congressional
(rather than state) power to oversee the manner of congressional
elections, for example, rested on the “plain proposition, that every
government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
205
preservation.” Could a loosely organized collection of autonomous
states properly manage the national debt? No, because “there is
206
nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.”

201. Id.
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 295–96.
203. This argument stemmed from the Constitution’s specification that debts owed by the
United States under the Articles of Confederation would persist under Article VI of the
Constitution. One of the “lesser criticisms” of the Constitution was that the omission from this
clause of any treatment of debts owed to the United States might imply the extinguishment of
such debts under the interpretive rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See id. at 295 (“[I]t
has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favour of the
United States, as well as against them; . . . the omission has been transformed and magnified
into a plot against the national rights.”).
204. Id. at 296. In similar fashion, Hamilton lambasted Cato’s suggestion that the president
could make appointments to fill vacancies in the Senate during congressional recesses. This
argument ignored Article I’s “clear and unambiguous” delegation of this power to state
legislatures, or to state governors “during the recess of the [l]egislature.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
67 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 456 (emphasis omitted). Cato’s argument, Hamilton
concluded, was “destitute . . . even of the merit of plausibility” and “must have originated in an
intention to deceive the people.” Id. at 456–57.
205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 398 (emphasis
omitted).
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 42 (adding that
“[t]here is perhaps nothing more likely to disturb the tranquility of nations, than their being
bound to mutual contributions for any common object, which does not yield an equal and
coincident benefit”).
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Madison also blasted away at critics for applying principles “to
207
cases to which the reason of them does not extend.”
Some
antifederalists, for example, faulted the framers for failing to require
periodic conventions to review and revise the federal Constitution.
These critics reasoned that, because past state constitutional
conventions had unfolded in a productive and harmonious manner,
there could be no harm in holding periodic federal conventions going
into the future. Madison responded that the temperance exhibited at
earlier state conventions cast no light because each of them had
occurred during the Revolutionary War. This fact was all-important
because:
[T]he existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger
which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord;
of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders,
which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national
questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms,
produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the
antient government; and whilst no spirit of party, connected with the
changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its
208
leven in the operation.

According to Madison, not one of these background conditions was
209
likely to exist with respect to any future federal convention. Thus
the “situations in which we must expect to be usually placed” in
upcoming years would not “present any equivalent security” against
210
factional cacophony and immoderation.

207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 359. In a similar vein,
Hamilton and Madison sometimes challenged antifederalist contentions on the ground that
embracing them would produce the very evils those arguments sought to avoid. Did it make
sense for antifederalists to object to the Constitution because it authorized a federal standing
army? No, because the very disunion they advocated would inevitably lead to such widespread
hostilities among neighboring states that large local standing armies would emerge. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 45–46.
208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 341.
209. Id.
210. Id. Similarly, as we have seen, antifederalists argued against two-year congressional
terms by invoking the slogan that “where annual elections end, tyranny begins.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 359. But this slogan had come from
Britain, where members of Parliament had gone so far as to extend their terms from three to
seven years, adding four years to the term for which they were elected. Id. at 361. The maxim
was therefore “wholly inapplicable to our case,” because the new Constitution fixed two-year
terms as the supreme law of the land unalterable in any way except by constitutional
amendment. Id. at 360.
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The authors of The Federalist often resorted to the multipronged
attack. In The Federalist No. 57, for example, Madison offered five
separate reasons why House members would seldom betray the
public trust even if they worked far from home: (1) voters would
typically elect deserving representatives; (2) widely shared values
would induce most representatives to act with honor and gratefulness
toward their constituents; (3) even undeserving representatives would
seek approbation out of self-interest; (4) frequent elections would
provide a strong measure of accountability; and (5) the “full
operation” of federal laws on the elected representatives themselves
211
would mitigate dangers of abuse. Not to be outdone, Hamilton
offered five reasons of his own against the imposition of presidential
term limits. He argued that (1) removing the possibility of re-election
would negate a powerful “inducement[] to good behaviour”; (2)
avaricious or ambitious presidents would be spurred to abuse their
office for personal gain if faced with the prospect of “descend[ing]
from the exalted eminence forever”; (3) term limits would “depriv[e]
the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief
magistrate in the exercise of his office”; (4) emergencies might call for
the leadership of “particular men” who, because of prior service,
would be barred from office; and (5) constantly changing the
occupant of the “first office in the nation” would interfere with the
212
stability of government.
Lawyers learn that facts persuade, and this working principle
pervades The Federalist. Some antifederalists argued, for example,
that the poor attendance records of members of the Confederation
Congress cut against further empowering a government for a territory
213
as expansive as the United States. Hamilton responded that past
attendance problems sprang from the impotence of the
214
Confederation government, rather than geographic dispersal. Any
doubt in this regard fell victim to the fact that “members from the
most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of

211. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 385–87.
212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 488–91.
213. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 85 (“[T]he natural
limit of a republic is that distance from the center, which will barely allow the representatives of
the people to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs.”).
214. Id.
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attendance, than those from the States in the neighbourhood of
215
Congress.”
In The Federalist No. 38, Madison used facts drawn from the
Articles of Confederation itself to rebut a host of challenges directed
at the new Constitution:
Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of a
fœderal government? The present Congress can make requisitions
to any amount they please; and the States are constitutionally bound
to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay
for the paper; they can borrow both abroad and at home, as long as
a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops
dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also;
and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and
unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same
body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole
depository of all the fœderal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to
give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the
same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of
Congress. Is a Bill of Rights essential to liberty? The Confederation
has no Bill of Rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution,
that it empowers the Senate with the concurrence of the Executive
to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing
Congress, without any such controul, can make treaties which they
themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized,
216
to be the supreme law of the land.

Citing these points, Madison asked how sensible citizens could resist
ratification when “most of the capital objections urged against the
new system, lie with tenfold weight against the existing
217
Confederation.”
This is not to say that all of Publius’s arguments themselves
218
reflected good sense. Hamilton, for example, erred in predicting

215. Id. And even if that evidence did not suffice, Hamilton added, in the near future
“intercourse throughout the union will be daily facilitated by new improvements” made to
roads, canals, and natural waterways. Id. at 86–87.
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 247.
217. Id.
218. In particular, the Papers did contain a number of simple errors. See, e.g., Roy P.
Fairfield, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at v, xxv (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966)
(noting Publius’s “misquoting of the Declaration, Constitution, Montesquieu, and other
sources”); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as Reliable Historical Source Material for
Constitutional Interpretation, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 601, 603–14 (2003) (noting imprecision or
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that the prohibition on appropriations to support military forces for
more than two years would in practice provide a “powerful guard”
219
against congressional maintenance of standing armies. History also
has discredited his suggestion in The Federalist No. 66 that the
requirement of the origination of revenue bills in the House would
220
fall among the “important counterpoises” to senatorial power.
(After all, senators can easily induce sympathetic House colleagues to
propose appropriations bills, and both chambers must enact these
221
bills, regardless of where they originate. )
Worst of all, Publius occasionally managed to shoot himself in
the foot. Responding to fears that federal taxing authority would
disrupt state revenue collections, for example, Hamilton predicted
that soon “the wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves
222
within a very narrow compass.” A moment’s reflection reveals that
this argument had a self-defeating quality, for patrons of state power
hardly wanted to hear that they need not worry about dampened tax
collections because soon the states would have no meaningful powers
223
at all! Missteps of this kind did not occur often in The Federalist. To
the extent they did, the essayists could take some comfort in the

error in Publius’s treatment of the size of the legislature, the quorum needed in the Senate, the
manner of selecting the vice-president, and the manner of selecting the president).
219. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 155. Hamilton’s
suggestion that legislators are subject to impeachment, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 450–51, has been rejected, as has his countertextual claim that
removal (as well as appointment) of executive officers would require Senate consent. See, e.g.,
RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 350 (documenting Hamilton’s change of mind, upon his candidacy
for Secretary of Finance, regarding the necessity of Senate consent for removal of executive
officers).
220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 448.
221. See also AMAR, supra note 72, at 107 (noting that the Origination Clause had “little
bite” because “the Senate would enjoy unlimited power to propose amendments”).
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 210.
223. Little less curious was Hamilton’s treatment of peace treaties in The Federalist No. 22.
There, he complained of the Articles’ supermajority voting requirements, voicing concern that
such requirements would invite “bribes and intrigues” from foreign powers to “tie up the hands
of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that
object.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 142. To be sure, the
new Constitution did not require treaty confirmation of two-thirds of all the states—just twothirds of the “Senators present.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Even so, given the Constitution’s own
supermajority requirement, Hamilton’s assault on this feature of the Articles smacked of
proving too much.
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excuse that they had no choice but to turn out their work at a
224
breakneck pace.
A final rhetorical technique, which runs throughout the Papers,
subtly bolstered Publius’s appeals to reason. Illustrative was
Madison’s assertion in The Federalist No. 43 that the unamendable
nature of the two-senators-per-state clause “was probably meant as a
palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, . . . and was
probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that
225
equality.” In reality, of course, Madison was not confined to
226
He had
reporting what “probably” happened in Philadelphia.
actually been there, and he knew exactly what had transpired. The
writers who had taken on the name of Publius, however, had reason
not to disclose anything like a personal stake in the constitutional
project born of their own past labors. Indeed, in defending the
Constitution’s structuring of government, Publius himself made use of
the maxim that “[n]o man ought certainly to be a judge . . . in any
227
cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.” As a
result, the voice of The Federalist took on the tone of a trustworthy
and omniscient neutral, marked by a rhetorical detachment calculated
228
to contribute to the credibility of the overall project.
D. The Wisdom of Compromise
In keeping with appeals to common sense, the authors of The
Federalist often stressed the need for practical accommodation.

224. See David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist,
and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 852 (2001) (adverting to Hamilton’s erroneous
and later-retracted assertion in No. 77 that the Senate must approve presidential removals, as
well as appointments, of executive officers; adding that “under the burden of the series as a
whole, his law practice, and his general politicking . . . , he simply got caught up in responding to
particular anti-federalist arguments and momentarily lost the forests in the trees”—something
“[t]hat can happen, even to a Hamilton or a Madison”).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 296.
226. But cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 237 (purporting to
extrapolate what “must have been” and what one “may well suppose” happened at the
Philadelphia Convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 265
(opining on what the delegates “must have reflected,” “must have recollected,” and “must have
borne in mind”).
227. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 538; accord THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 59.
228. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT 165 (1992) (noting that the
style of Hamilton and Madison rendered each of them a “pretended outsider” to the
Convention); WILLS, supra note 28, at 22 (describing the persona of Publius as that of an
“impartial judge”).
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Publius, for example, did not try to convince New Yorkers that equal
representation of the states in the Senate was a good idea. Instead,
Madison acknowledged in The Federalist No. 62 that this feature of
the Constitution was “evidently the result of compromise between the
229
opposite pretensions of the large and the small states” reached in a
230
setting where “neither side would entirely yield to the other.” Ever
the pragmatist, he added that “[a] government founded on principles
more consonant to the wishes of the larger states, is not likely to be
231
obtained from the smaller states.” Thus, “the advice of prudence”
counseled that New York should accept the deal offered by the
232
Constitution while it still lay on the table.
Publius took much the same approach in defending the infamous
Three-Fifths Compromise, under which slaves were treated as a
fractional part of a person for purposes of allocating House seats.
Hamilton, an ardent abolitionist, could not bring himself to write on
this topic. Madison, however, addressed it in The Federalist No. 54,
urging that, even though southern arguments for the three-fifths
approach were “a little strained in some points,” this “compromising
233
expedient of the Constitution [should] be mutually adopted.”
Political realities dictated other outcomes as well. The
appointment of senators by state legislatures, though not Publius’s
preferred approach, embodied the selection method “most congenial
234
with the public opinion”;
thus, even if it operated as “an
inconvenience,” this methodology had been adopted “for the
235
attainment of a . . . greater good.” Madison also recoiled at the
Constitution’s approach to voter eligibility, under which the franchise
in federal elections varied from locale to locale, depending on each
state’s qualification standards for elections to its own larger legislative
236
chamber.
Nonetheless, he urged patience with this approach
because the better option of a uniform nationwide rule “would

229. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 416.
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 237.
231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 416–17.
232. Id. at 417.
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 371, 369.
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 416.
235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 401.
236. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”).
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probably have been . . . dissatisfactory to some of the States” and
237
“difficult to the Convention.”
In all these cases, according to Madison, “the Convention must
have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of
238
extraneous considerations.” The document now before the people
was not a constitution planned by “an ingenious theorist . . . in his
239
closet or in his imagination.”
It was less than ideal because
“compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct states . . . must . . .
240
be a compromise of . . . many dissimilar interests and inclinations.”
Yet, “[i]f mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of
government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact
standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of
241
anarchy, and the world a desert.”
In a similar vein, Publius acknowledged that highly principled
justifications could not be identified for many of the lines drawn in
the Constitution. How often should elections occur? The proper
interval of time “does not appear to be susceptible of any precise
242
calculation.”
How many representatives should represent how
many people? Again, the problem is not “susceptible of a precise
solution”; in fact, there is no “point on which the policy of the several
243
How long should a person have
states is more at variance.”
citizenship before qualifying to run for the Senate? Who knows? But
nine years “appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total
exclusion of adopted citizens . . . and hasty admission of them, which
244
might create a channel for foreign influence.” How many states
should join together in ratifying a constitutional amendment
proposed by two-thirds of the House and of the Senate? Threequarters of the states seemed about the right number in order to
guard “equally against that extreme facility which would render the

237. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 354.
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 237.
239. Id. at 238.
240. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 591.
241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 444. For this reason,
Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 65 that “[t]o answer the purpose of the adversaries of the
Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely, that particular provisions in it are not the best,
which might have been imagined; but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious.” Id. at
444–45.
242. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 355.
243. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 373.
244. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 415–16.
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Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might
245
perpetuate its discovered faults.”
These points demonstrated that the framers had sought earnestly
to find fair accommodations among the welter of proposals put
246
forward at the Convention. In The Federalist No. 38, Publius sought
to build on this theme by turning antifederalist objections to the
federalists’ advantage. The following passage (much longer in its
entirety) catches the flavor of the argument:
An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the
unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector
in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in
the house of representatives. From this quarter we are alarmed with
the amazing expence from the number of persons who are to
administer the new Government. From another quarter, and
sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is
that the Congress will be but the shadow of a representation, and
that the Government would be far less objectionable, if the number
and the expence were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not
import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power
of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports
and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes
may be thrown on consumption. . . . In the eyes of one the junction
of the Senate with the President in the responsible function of
appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the
executive, alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another,
the exclusion of the house of representatives whose numbers alone
could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the
exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the
admission of the President into any share of power which must ever
be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an
247
unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy.

Madison’s point was not only that the self-contradictory nature of
antifederalist objections revealed their shaky foundations. The deeper
point was that the framers already had navigated with extraordinary
skill a middle course among the very clutter of criticisms now lodged

245. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 296.
246. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 443 (noting
that, for presidential impeachments, given a choice between Senate trials and trials before a
joint session of the Senate and the Supreme Court, the framers picked “perhaps the prudent
mean”—trial in the Senate with the Chief Justice presiding).
247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 244–45.
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against the constitutional proposal. In all of this, there was a deeper
point still: Hamilton, Madison, and Jay stood ready to discuss openly
the Constitution’s shortcomings and, in doing so, to build a bridge of
candor to their readers to reinforce the credibility of their larger
project.
One curiosity of the Federalist Papers is that they defend many
constitutional provisions that Hamilton or Madison had condemned
at the Philadelphia Convention. Hamilton, for example, gave an
infamous Convention speech, later used to tar him as a monarchist, in
248
which he advocated life terms for both presidents and senators. As
if to reaffirm the extremity of his views, Hamilton reported to his
fellow delegates in one of the last speeches of the Convention that
“[n]o man’s ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were
249
known to be.” At the Convention, Madison also advocated many
ideas that never found their way into the Constitution. He had been,
for example, an unsuccessful advocate of proportionate
representation in the Senate, of unimpeded federal authority to
restrict the slave trade, and of a congressional power to veto state
250
laws.
Cynics might cite these points in arguing that The Federalist has a
disingenuous quality. Perhaps so. But one might also view the essays
through another prism—with the thought that the project may well
251
have brought new clarity to these former Convention delegates.
One senses in reading the essays that Hamilton and Madison had
come to grasp at a deeper level the intricacies of the document, the
subtlety of its themes, the careful balances it struck, and the neatness
with which its provisions fit together. At the very least, the writing of
the Federalist Papers must have heightened the authors’ awareness of
the framers’ extraordinary practical achievement. From a crazy quilt
of conflicting personal, regional, and theoretical positions, the
248. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 289 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937) (setting forth Madison’s notes, which describe Hamilton’s speech of June 18
before the Convention: “Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life” and “[l]et
the Executive also be for life”).
249. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 645–46.
250. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 248, at 151.
251. See, e.g., ALBERT FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS 147 (1984)
(suggesting that drafting triggered a “dynamic” process in the “two strong minds” of Publius);
WILLS, supra note 28, at 93 (noting that Hamilton critiqued the Constitution before it was
finalized, had the benefit of learning what was “realizable” in the ratification controversy, and
may have experienced “real changes of mind between his [Convention] speech and the
composition of The Federalist”).
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Philadelphia Convention had forged a coherent treatment of
government creatively designed to meet the new nation’s needs.
252
Publius knew that “a faultless plan was not to be expected.” For
sensible Americans, it would suffice “that the system, though it may
not be perfect in every part, is upon the whole a good one, is the best
that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit,
and is such a one as promises every species of security which a
253
reasonable people can desire.”
E. Imagery and Metaphor
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay knew well that few readers would
pore over intricate arguments set forth in arid prose. As a result,
254
Publius laced the tracts with imagery, symbolism, and color.
Metaphor surfaced often. A strong federal Supreme Court was
needed because “[t]hirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction . . .
is a hydra . . . from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
255
256
proceed.” There was “poison” in antifederalist arguments. It was
time to “break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from
257
the paths of felicity and prosperity.”
Hamilton, in particular, delighted in this style of rhetoric and
used it with frequency in castigating his adversaries. The writings of
antifederalist critics, he observed in The Federalist No. 8, suggested
that
“airy
phantoms . . . flit
before
[their]
distempered
258
imaginations.” In The Federalist No. 29 he added that:
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man
is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill written tale or romance;
which instead of natural and agreeable images exhibits to the mind
nothing but frightful and distorted shapes . . . discoloring and

252. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 232; see CHERNOW, supra
note 8, at 246 (adding that “all the delegates at Philadelphia had adopted the final document in
a spirit of compromise” and then “approached it as a collective work and championed it as the
best available solution”).
253. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 590.
254. See generally Philip Abbott, What’s New in the Federalist Papers?, 49 POL. RES. Q. 525,
528 (1996) (emphasizing Publius’s “excellence as a storyteller”).
255. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 535.
256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88.
257. Id. at 92.
258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 49–50.
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disfiguring whatever it represents and transforming every thing it
259
touches into a monster.

Hamilton’s use of metaphor reached full flower in The Federalist
No. 9, when he observed that ancient republics, even when built on
260
democratic principles, had encountered only “furious storms.”
History offered hope because “stupendous fabrics reared on the basis
of liberty” had “in a few glorious instances” provided models for
261
America. Even so:
If now and then intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we
behold them with a mixture of regret arising from the reflection that
the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the
tempestuous waves of sedition and party-rage. If momentary rays of
glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a
transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us
to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction
and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted
indowments, for which the favoured soils, that produced them, have
262
been so justly celebrated.

Hamilton’s purple prose supported a conclusion also captured in
metaphorical terms: Americans must abandon the localized model of
democratic self-rule to build “the broad and solid foundation” on
263
which “permanent monuments” to republican liberty could rise up.
Madison was drawn to allegory. In The Federalist No. 37, for
example, he took on antifederalist grumbling about the difficulty of
defining the precise reach of state and federal powers. “The most
sagacious and laborious naturalists,” Madison explained, “have never
yet succeeded, in tracing with certainty, the line which separates the
district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized
matter, or which marks the termination of the former and the
264
commencement of the animal empire.” Madison’s message was
hard to miss: Just as surely as students of natural science should not
abandon biological classifications because of the difficulty of the task,

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185–86.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton ), supra note 14, at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 51.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 235.
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patrons of political science had to tolerate some measure of
265
imprecision in laying down the boundary lines of power.
In The Federalist No. 38, Madison again turned to allegory to
attack the litany of small criticisms leveled by antifederalist objectors.
He explained that:
No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation,
for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a
porch to it; or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or
smaller, or the cieling [sic] a little higher or lower than his fancy
266
would have planned them.

Madison drove home the point with the parable of the stricken
man. Called by a dying patient, a group of physicians (who were
carefully selected by him because of their distinguished
267
accomplishments) unanimously agreed on a course of treatment.
Then, another group of doctors appeared on the scene. With
blustering self-assurance, each of them challenged their colleagues’
proposed plan, insisting to the patient that it would “poison . . . his
268
constitution.”
Drawing on this story to attack antifederalist
natterers, Madison posed two telling questions:
Might not the patient reasonably demand before he ventured to
follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among
themselves, on some other remedy to be substituted? and if he
found them differing as much from one another, as from his first
counsellors, would he not act prudently, in trying the experiment
unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than in hearkening
to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy,
269
nor agree in proposing one?

Publius’s use of imagery in portraying America’s present state—as “a
270
situated at “the point of extreme
poor pitiful figure”
271
depression” —went far in suggesting to wavering New Yorkers that
they needed to think hard about a change of national direction. And
265. See id. (recounting that “[e]xperience has instructed us that no skill in the science of
Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary”).
266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 246–47.
267. Id. at 242–43.
268. Id. at 243.
269. Id.
270. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 23.
271. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 35.
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the imagery employed in describing America’s unrealized potential—
272
as a nation forged in a “common bond of amity,” united by “the
273
274
affection of friends,” and “not heated by the local flame” —
bespoke the wisdom of embracing the much-strengthened central
government proposed by the new Constitution. In all of this, Publius
sought to render more graphic and more gripping the reasoned
arguments for ratification around which The Federalist was built.
F. Appeals to Emotion
The essence of The Federalist lay in its presentation of
relentlessly logical arguments in an “elevated and philosophical
275
tone.” The authors, however, sought to appeal to the heart as well
as to the head. They did so, most of all, by characterizing in heatedly
unflattering terms their antifederalist adversaries, as well as the
contentions those adversaries advanced.
Some antifederalist arguments involved overreaches that
exposed their authors to obvious attack. In The Federalist No. 27, for
example, Hamilton mocked the suggestion that only military troops
could enforce federal law as resting “on mere general assertion;
unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of . . .
276
reasons.” In The Federalist No. 29, he was no less dismissive of
antifederalist predictions that the proposed new government would
inevitably abuse its military powers. As he wrote:
At one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the
liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are
to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles to tame
the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of
Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the
refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons,
who rave at this rate, imagine, that their art or their eloquence can
impose any conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for
277
infallible truths?

272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 591.
273. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 294.
274. Id.
275. James W. Ducayet, Note, Publius And Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The
Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 821, 852 (1993); see RAKOVE,
supra note 34, at 132 (describing the “lucidity and cool rationality” of The Federalist).
276. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 171.
277. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 186.
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Madison denigrated those who detected a grant of unlimited
regulatory powers in the General Welfare Clause, which by its clear
terms concerned only the federal taxing and spending authority. “No
stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these
writers labour for objections,” he exclaimed, “than their stooping to
278
such a misconstruction.” In essence, the authors of The Federalist
kept asking: Who can believe such critics? “A bad cause seldom fails
to betray itself,” Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 41, adding that
“[o]f this truth, the management of the opposition to the Federal
279
Government is an unvaried exemplification.”
Challenges to the credibility of antifederalist writers sometimes
shaded into more aggressive forms of attack. Antifederalist objections
to lifetime judicial appointments, for example, showed “the rage for
280
objection which disorders their imaginations and judgments.”
Concern expressed about oppression at the hands of federally
controlled state militias was “so far fetched . . . that one is at a loss
281
whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery.” To Madison,
antifederalist arguments “must appear to every one more like the
incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged
exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions
282
of genuine patriotism.”
Critics who expounded self-evidently
strained positions had to be acting out of self-serving pettiness, if not
283
“magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement.”
In effect, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay sought to “double dip” on
their invocations of history and reason. After laying out an argument
284
said to be unanswerable by “men of discernment,” they would ask
how that argument could be rejected by anyone not driven by “a
285
286
a “distempered jealousy,”
predetermination to condemn,”
278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 277.
279. Id. at 274.
280. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 522.
281. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185.
282. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 321.
283. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 145. In The
Federalist No. 9, the unrelenting Hamilton suggested why antifederalists might advocate a
system of atomized states in separate subconfederacies. “[T]he multiplication of petty offices,”
he observed, might “answer the views of men, who possess not qualifications to extend their
influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 53.
284. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195.
285. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 232.
286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 399.
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287

“obstinacy, perverseness or disingenuity,”
or “political
288
Could expressions of concern about the central
fanaticism.”
government’s oppression of the citizenry with state militias truly
reflect “the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning
289
people?” More likely, they were “the inflammatory ravings of
290
chagrined incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts.” For Hamilton,
expressions of concern about a standing army smacked of scare tactics
291
“unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.” “[A] man of
calm and dispassionate feelings,” Hamilton opined, “would indulge a
sigh for the frailty of human nature; and would lament that in a
matter so interesting to the happiness of millions the true merits of
the question should be perplexed and entangled by [these]
292
expedients.”
Publius did not hesitate to suggest that antifederalist contentions
293
294
reflected “disingenuous artifice,” “false impressions,” “political
295
and
the
“exaggerated
colours
of
legerdemain,”
296
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay questioned
misrepresentation.”
297
whether antifederalists were “sincere in their opposition” and urged
readers to consider whether opposing essayists were so driven by an
298
“imprudent zeal” that they might seek “to instill prejudices at any
299
price.” In all of this there was irony, for Publius had both professed

287. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195.
288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. In The
Federalist No. 29, after obliterating the contention that federal authorities could not deputize
citizens for law enforcement purposes, Publius asked: “What shall we think of the motives which
could induce men of sense to reason in this manner?” Id. at 183; accord THE FEDERALIST NO.
31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195 (“How else could it happen . . . that positions so
clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of
the union, should have to encounter any adversaries . . . ?”).
289. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 186–87.
290. Id. at 187.
291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 155.
292. Id.
293. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185.
294. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 54.
295. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 227.
296. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 204; see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 154 (warning of “an experiment
upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive or by the
overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous”).
297. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195.
298. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 206.
299. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185.
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at the outset an intention to appeal only to “the genuine and sober
300
dictates” of the reader’s judgment and chided other essayists for
301
In his concluding essay,
“the bitterness of their invectives.”
Hamilton went so far as to congratulate himself on the temperance he
had displayed in taking on critics of the Constitution:
I trust at least you will admit, that I have not failed in the assurance I
gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavours should be
conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and
have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to
302
disgrace political disputants of all parties . . . .

Then, touching the edges of self-contradiction, Hamilton added:
The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which
has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan,
has something in it too wanton and too malignant not to excite the
indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of
the calumny. . . . And the unwarrantable concealments and
misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to
keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand
303
the reprobation of all honest men.

Perhaps Hamilton, Madison, and Jay could not resist the urge to
decry political opponents whose own writings brimmed with
304
305
“unhallowed language,”
“virulent invective,”
and “petulant
306
declamation.” This was an era, after all, in which one writer might
307
308
describe another as a “monkey,” a “blockhead,” or even among
309
“the ‘meanest traitors that ever dishonoured the human character.’”
In a lamentably low moment, the essayist Inspector had dubbed
Hamilton “Tom Shit” (the actual spelling was “Tom S—t”) and

300. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 589.
301. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 5.
302. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 589.
303. Id.
304. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88.
305. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 204.
306. Id.
307. DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 100 (quoting one writer’s barb that “[a] monkey has more
unexceptionable claim to reason” (quoting A Friend to Common Sense, N.Y. J., Dec. 18, 1787)).
308. Id. (quoting comment by “Examiner” that “[a]s to that sniveling blockhead,
Democritus, his drunken performance does not indeed merit a reply” (quoting Examiner III,
N.Y. J., Dec. 18, 1787)).
309. BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW 107 (2003).
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described him as a mixed-race “mustee” who had “quitted [his] native
310
Faced with vilification of this sort,
soil in the torrid zone.”
Hamilton—not surprisingly—confessed to moments in which
“moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been
so copiously vented . . . without emotions that disturb its
311
equanimity.” And to such remarks, he added the telling clincher
that, if the line of proper discourse had been crossed, the wrong had
312
occurred “neither often nor much.”
It may be that Publius lashed out at antifederalist adversaries
because natural human feelings of resentment left no choice. It may
be that, as Hamilton stated in defense of his most heated rhetoric,
explicit accusations of antifederalist mendacity were necessary to help
“sincere lovers of their country” conduct a “fair and candid
313
examination” of the Constitution. A broad-gauged look at The
Federalist, however, suggests that another motive was at work.
Through a constancy of aspersion tied to reasoned argument, Publius
sowed the seeds of skepticism at a visceral level. By portraying
antifederalists as dark-hearted as well as wrong-headed, Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay appealed to deep-seated human sensibilities tied to
pride, caution, resentment, indignation, and even self-preservation. It
is hardly surprising that, in pursuing their project of persuasion, the
authors of The Federalist should draw on forces rooted so deeply in
the human psyche.
The Federalist’s emotional appeal for ratification had a positive,
as well as a negative, edge. In particular, The Federalist’s authors
aligned the Constitution, its framers, and its defenders with the spirit
of the American Revolution and the intellectual forces that had given

310. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 245. Mindful of these excesses, Albert Furtwangler
emphasized “the consistent high tone” of The Federalist. FURTWANGLER, supra note 251, at 81;
see also id. at 75 (asserting that Publius “practiced severe restraint”); id. at 81–82 (claiming that
Publius’s work “served as a damper on the violence of the ratification debate” and “shows three
important writers laboring to assert calm reason”); id. at 97 (arguing that “the authority of
Publius is strong because of his high civility”). Particularly in the context of a tempestuous time,
this depiction has some accuracy. Moreover, it would be wrong to suppose that name-calling
pervades The Federalist, most of which is given over to logical examination of relevant subjects.
Even so, the appellations collected in the text—and many others too—counsel caution in
characterizing The Federalist in terms as unequivocal as Furtwangler employs.
311. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 204.
312. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 589.
313. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 155 (referring to
arguments that the Constitution did not prevent standing armies in peace time as “clamours”
and “dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition”).

COENEN FINAL.DOC

522

11/28/2006 3:50 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:469
314

it birth. Their essays cited the Declaration of Independence and its
315
The heroes of American
great author, Thomas Jefferson.
independence had “accomplished a revolution which has no parallel
316
in the annals of human society,”
and Publius portrayed the
Constitution as the logical continuation of that revolutionary process.
As Madison put the point in The Federalist No. 14, for a people bold
and ingenious enough to break the chains of British oppression, “[i]t
is only to be lamented, that any of her citizens should wish to deprive
her of the additional merit of displaying” the “full efficacy” of
317
republican self-rule.
Like the Revolution, the Constitution would draw Americans
together: “[T]he mingled blood which [Americans] have shed in
defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their union, and excite
318
horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.” Like
the Revolution, the Constitution would promote ideals far removed
from the petty interests that marked America’s experience under the
Articles of Confederation. “Was . . . the hard earned substance of
millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace,
liberty and safety; but that the Governments of the individual
States . . . [might] be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
319
sovereignty?” And like the Revolution, the Constitution was rooted
in a selfless collaboration of fearless and far-sighted patriots. Indeed,
the Philadelphia Convention had brought together “some of the most
distinguished members of [the Revolutionary Congress of 1774], who
have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and
320
abilities.”
314. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 265 (arguing for
the right to “abolish or alter” the government (quoting the Declaration of Independence)).
315. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 335 (discussing
Jefferson’s constitutional efforts in Virginia).
316. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 89.
317. Id. at 84–85.
318. Id. at 88.
319. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 309.
320. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 12. Jay went so far as to suggest
that the Philadelphia Convention was rightly viewed as the second coming of the “Memorable
Congress of 1774.” Id. at 11. As with the work of the Convention, the proposals of that
“Patriotic Congress” had caused “the Press . . . to teem with Pamphlets and weekly Papers
against [its] measures” even though time had “proved their wisdom.” Id. Both assemblies had
brought together men “convened from different parts of the country,” id., who gave themselves
over for an extended period to a process of “mature deliberation,” id. at 12. Indeed, “some of
the most distinguished members of [the 1774] Congress . . . who have grown old in acquiring
political information, were also members of this Convention.” Id. Thus, “if the people at large
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It is of interest that the names of Washington and Franklin
appear in none of the eighty-five essays. Even so, the stature of these
321
luminaries and their fellow framers overhung all that Publius wrote.
In The Federalist No. 37, Madison recalled that “[t]he history of
almost all the great councils and consultations, held among mankind
for reconciling their discordant opinions . . . is a history of factions,
contentions, and disappointments; and may be classed among the
most dark and degrading pictures which display the infirmities and
322
depravities of the human character.” In contrast, the Philadelphia
323
Convention had cast a “lustre to darken the gloom.” Drawing on
the image of the selfless patriot, Madison proclaimed that “all the
deputations composing the Convention, were either satisfactorily
accommodated by the final act; or were induced to accede to it, by a
deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and
324
partial interests to the public good.”
Publius made use of America’s revolutionary heritage in a
variety of ways. For example he assured readers that, although the
Constitution included novel elements, citizens who had pressed a
325
revolution to success should not hesitate to embrace “what is new.”
Many innovations had been “displayed on the American theatre,”
had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had then been fully tried or
generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the
Convention.” Id. Notably, the very idea of a constitution coming forth from a convention was a
revolutionary innovation. In the past, Madison explained, the task of framing a government had
fallen to “some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity”—like Minos
of Crete, Lycurgus of Sparta, or Romulus of Rome. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison),
supra note 14, at 240. The very different mode of the proceeding in Philadelphia reflected an
“improvement made by America,” and it underscored the singularity of the Convention’s
achievement. Id. at 241. This achievement, according to Madison, was all the greater because
there was no “want of . . . care in the investigation” conducted by the assembled delegates. Id.
So it was because those gathered had recognized “that the hopes and expectations of the great
body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety, to the
event of their deliberations.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 264.
321. The competence of the Philadelphia delegates was unquestionably broad and deep. As
Catherine Drinker Bowen has written:
Nearly three-fourths [of the delegates] had sat in the Continental Congress. Many
had been members of their state legislatures and had helped to write their state
constitutions in the first years after Independence. Eight had signed the Declaration,
seven had been state governors, twenty-one had fought in the Revolutionary War.
When Jefferson in Paris read the names he said it was “an assembly of demi-gods.”
BOWEN, supra note 47, at 4.
322. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 238.
323. Id. at 239.
324. Id.
325. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88.
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and it was “the glory of the people of America” to eschew “a blind
326
veneration for antiquity.” In The Federalist No. 11, Hamilton sought
to build support for the Constitution by tapping into optimistic
notions of American ascendancy and uniqueness. Disunion, he
admonished, would vindicate the “arrogant pretensions of the
European” that had “tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of
the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her
327
benefit.” It had fallen to America to rise above the station of longoppressed Asians and Africans and to “vindicate the honor of the
328
human race.” Hamilton’s words crackled with patriotic fervor:
Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness!
Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble
union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the
controul of all trans-atlantic force or influence, and able to dictate
329
the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!

The Federalist’s celebration of the Revolution also helped allay
concerns about the purported unlawfulness of the Philadelphia
330
Convention. One problem arose from the fact that the Constitution
would take effect upon approval by only nine states, even though the
Articles of Confederation in express terms conditioned their
331
modification on unanimous state action. Another problem existed
because the Confederation Congress had directed delegates to meet
“for the sole and express purpose” of proposing modifications to the

326. Id.
327. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 72.
328. Id. at 72–73.
329. Id. at 73.
330. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison) (discussing this subject at
length). The debate on whether the ratification was, strictly speaking, legal continues to this day.
Compare Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994) (arguing that the founding was legal because it
was rooted in popular sovereignty), with Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 476 (1995) (rejecting the idea that the founding was
“consummately legal”), and Henry Paul Monaghan, We The People[s], Original Understanding,
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121 (1996) (characterizing Amar’s
argument as “appealing, but historically groundless”).
331. Compare ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (“[N]or shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of [the Articles of this Confederation]; unless such alteration be
agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of
every State.”), with U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States,
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same.”).
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Articles of Confederation, and not for the purpose of proposing an
332
entirely new charter of government. Responding to critiques based
on these facts, Madison focused on the same principle of “absolute[]
333
necess[ity]” that had spawned the American Revolution.
For
Publius, the “law of nature and of nature’s God” dictated “the great
principle of self-preservation” and required abandonment of political
334
institutions at odds with “the safety and happiness of society.” The
Philadelphia delegates, much like the heroes of the Revolution, had
encountered “a system so radically vicious and unsound” that it did
not “admit . . . of amendment” but instead required “an entire change
335
The “peculiarly
in its leading features and characters.”
distinguished” leaders who gathered in Philadelphia thus chose the
path of not “sacrificing substance to forms,” but instead of “exercising
a manly confidence in their country, by . . . pointing out a system
336
capable in their judgment of securing its happiness.” Like the
Revolution, this action reflected the “patriotic emotion” of the
337
“virtuous citizen.” “[I]f [the framers] had exceeded their powers,”
Publius concluded in The Federalist No. 40, they were—just like the
leaders of a decade before—“required, as the confidential servants of
their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to
338
exercise the liberty which they assumed.”
According to Publius, the Constitution was properly aligned not
only with the spirit of the Revolution but with the views of great
philosophers who helped spur revolutionary thinking. The essayists
cited thinkers such as Grotius, Mably, and Hume, noting with
Enlightenment-era enthusiasm that “[t]he science of politics . . . like
339
most other sciences has received great improvement” over time.
340
Publius also relied on contemporary writers like Blackstone and the

332. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 259.
333. Id. at 264.
334. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 297.
335. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 144–45.
336. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 266.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 267.
339. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 51.
340. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 465, 467 (citing
Blackstone in footnote); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 577
(citing the “judicious Blackstone”).
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341

English essayist Junius. The authors of The Federalist, however,
heaped their most lavish attention on the writings of the French
political philosopher Montesquieu, who had developed and defended
the notion of separated governmental powers in his masterpiece, The
342
In challenging the proposed Constitution,
Spirit of Laws.
antifederalists trumpeted this work, extracting from it the idea that
republican governments stood no chance of success except in small
343
geographical settings. In The Federalist No. 9, Hamilton sought to
debunk this reading of Montesquieu, thus aligning the name of the
great political philosopher with the work of the Philadelphia
344
Convention.
Did an even higher authority support the case for ratification?
Jay wrote in The Federalist No. 2 that “it appears as if it was the
design of Providence, that [this] band of brethren, united to each
other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of
345
unsocial, jealous and alien sovereignties.” Hamilton could not bring
346
himself to urge that God had taken sides in the ratification debate,
but Madison seemed ready to make the case. In The Federalist No. 37,
he first celebrated the solidarity and success of the Philadelphia

341. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 479 (citing the
“celebrated Junius”).
342. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 53–54 (quoting
Montesquieu at length); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 295
(quoting Montesquieu on the “advantages of a confederate republic” in quelling insurrection).
For background information about many of the authors Publius cites, see generally Robert G.
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1095–136 (2004).
343. See, e.g., Brutus I, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 363, 368 (quoting Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws on the
advantages of a small republic); Cato III, N.Y. J., Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 109, 110 (same). Storing believes Publius was responding
specifically to Cato’s invocation of Montesquieu. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 18, at 127 n.11 (editorial note).
344. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 53–54 (quoting
Montesquieu’s advocacy of reforms “by which smaller States agree to become members of a
larger one,” and thus arguing that his writings “contain luminous abridgement of principal
arguments in favour of the Union”).
345. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 9.
346. So it was even though the New Yorker apparently was, in some fashion, a religious
man. See CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 132 (noting that “Eliza never doubted her husband’s
faith,” although “Hamilton refrained from a formal church affiliation”); see also id. at 205
(adding that, although Hamilton “did not seem to attend church regularly,” he probably
embraced deism and “never doubted God’s existence”). See generally Douglass Adair & Marvin
Harvey, Was Alexander Hamilton a Christian Statesman?, reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON
230 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1967).
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Convention in the face of overwhelming odds. Then he turned to the
broader theme:
It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this
circumstance, without partaking of . . . astonishment. It is impossible
for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it, a finger of that
Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended
347
to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.

III. JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON THE FEDERALIST
The preceding account reveals that The Federalist embodies a
strategic argument designed to win an intense political campaign. This
historical fact raises a question of pressing contemporary significance:
How does the argumentative nature of the essays affect the legitimacy
of relying on them as a source of modern-day constitutional
interpretation?
The question is timely for two reasons. First, in recent decades
the Supreme Court has invoked The Federalist with far greater
frequency than in earlier time periods; indeed, as Professor Ira Lupu
documents, “[m]ore than half of all the Supreme Court decisions in
which one or more citations to The Federalist appear have been
348
rendered since 1970.” Second, in a bevy of recent scholarly writings,
commentators have grappled with the question whether the courts
have any business consulting The Federalist as they search for
349
constitutional meaning. Not surprisingly, some observers argue that
the essays should carry little interpretive freight precisely because of
the key point developed in this paper⎯namely, that The Federalist
was a highly argumentative and politically motivated document.
These analysts contend that it is unsound to seek the Constitution’s

347. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 238.
348. Lupu, supra note 5, at 1330.
349. See generally Ducayet, supra note 275; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301
(1998); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 (1998); J. Michael Martinez & William D.
Richardson, The Federalist Papers and Legal Interpretation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 307 (2000);
McGowan, supra note 224; Tillman, supra note 218.
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meaning by consulting what was at worst “propaganda” and at best
351
“political advocacy.”
Critiques of this kind, while understandable, tend to oversimplify
analysis, in part because there are different theories about why courts
may use The Federalist to help resolve constitutional ambiguities. In
particular, various observers posit five significant arguments in
support of judicial reliance on the Papers. According to these
theories, judicial use of The Federalist properly reflects (1) their
iconic status; (2) their utility as “legislative history”; (3) their
dictionary-like character; (4) their function as learned commentary;
and (5) their embodiment of exceptionally wise insights about the
sound functioning of government. Any fair consideration of The
Federalist’s role in constitutional interpretation must take account of
each of these approaches, and I undertake such an evaluation in the
pages that follow. I offer this evaluation only as a tentative account of
my still-developing views of this complex subject. Even this
preliminary account suggests, however, that adherents of all five
theories have much work to do in reconciling their positions with the
argumentative purpose of The Federalist. Nonetheless, in the end,
that purpose does not preclude judicial reliance on the essays. In fact,
in one important way, the authors’ purpose of persuasion reinforces
the case that courts should make use of The Federalist in resolving
hard questions of constitutional law.
A. The Federalist as Icon
The first argument for the propriety of judicial use of Publius’s
writings is the most straightforward. According to this theory, The
Federalist stands at the heart of our legal culture. It is celebrated. It is
revered. It is the subject of grade school social studies and high school
civics classes. How can it possibly be⎯so the argument goes⎯that
courts should not consider in the process of constitutional
interpretation a text that is almost as basic to American law as the
Constitution itself? It is simply unthinkable, on this view, that courts
352
could ignore a legal text of such iconic status.

350. Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1309.
351. Manning, supra note 349, at 1339 (adding that the essays’ contents thus “may at times
reflect the exigencies of debate”).
352. For one variation of this argument, see Manning, supra note 349, at 1355 n.69
(discussing The Federalist’s “canonical status” and possibility of its legitimate use as an
interpretive tool because it has “become an important part of a long-standing constitutional
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The difficulty with this argument is that many things are icons.
Elvis is an icon. The American Flag is an icon. The work of
Shakespeare is an icon. But neither Elvis nor the Flag nor
Shakespeare tells us anything about the meaning of the Constitution.
The obvious response to these observations is that The Federalist is an
icon that specifically concerns the Constitution. But so what? The
Federalist may be an icon that concerns the Constitution for reasons
that provide it with no serious claim to legitimacy as a source of
constitutional interpretation. Its fame might result primarily from an
emotional sense of connection to its celebrated (indeed, iconic)
authors. Or its glory might stem⎯especially in light of its
argumentative purpose⎯from its association with the great victory
achieved in securing ratification of the Constitution. These things
might make The Federalist an icon, but they do not make it a proper
indicator of constitutional meaning.
In fairness, much of the rhetoric that concerns and supports The
Federalist’s celebrated stature does suggest, at least at first blush, that
it is a valuable wellspring of constitutional information. Chief Justice
John Marshall, for example, described the essays as “a complete
353
commentary on our [C]onstitution,” and Justice Samuel Chase
attributed to Publius “extensive and accurate knowledge of the true
354
principles of Government.”
These Justices, however, never
considered the critical question whether the argumentative nature of
The Federalist undermines its status as a sound source of
constitutional meaning. Even more important, the Supreme Court as
a whole has never considered in explicit terms this now-familiar line
of attack. In essence, writers like Chief Justice Marshall and Justice
Chase do little more than assume the conclusion that The Federalist
merits attention in interpreting the Constitution.
In the end, the argumentative nature of The Federalist threatens
its claim as an authoritative source as to the meaning of the
Constitution. The reason why is simple: It is hard to say that The
Federalist sets forth an authoritative elaboration of the Constitution,
culture”). See also Ducayet, supra note 275, at 821 (noting that “The Federalist has long enjoyed
a talismanic status in American constitutional interpretation” and that courts “start from the
premise that [the Papers] are vested with a special kind of power to help resolve issues of
constitutional meaning”); id. at 856 (suggesting that, because “The Federalist occupies an
important position within American political culture,” a proper theory of interpretation “ought
to account for [it] in some fashion”).
353. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
354. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798).
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when its purpose was not to set forth such an elaboration, but instead
was to achieve a political objective of generating popular support for
the Constitution and the election of proratification delegates. Many
forms of advocacy, after all, are precisely the sorts of materials that
judges would never cite as useful touchstones of textual meaning. For
example, great briefs might be filed in constitutional cases, and great
oral presentations might be delivered, too. Yet the Supreme Court
would not give authoritative legal status to Thurgood Marshall’s
argument in Brown v. Board of Education or to Clarence Darrow’s
speeches at the Scopes Trial, even though those addresses have
achieved iconic status. Even more to the point, it is almost
unimaginable that courts charged with ascribing meaning to a legal
text would rely on partisan campaign literature and one-sided letters
to the editor. Yet these labels apply readily to The Federalist Papers.
For these reasons, it is eminently sensible to wonder why the modern
court, in discharging its interpretive mission, should give attention to
355
writings that embody “a brief in favor of ratification,” and that
356
reflect⎯to use Madison’s own words⎯“the zeal of advocates”?
There may be a good answer to this question. But it does not suffice
to say, without more, that The Federalist has a towering stature.
B. The Federalist as Legislative History
A more nuanced defense of The Federalist has its roots in the
longstanding
practice
of
considering
background
legal
materials⎯such as committee reports and floor debates⎯in ascribing
meaning to ambiguous legal texts. The idea behind the consideration
of such materials is that the touchstone of interpretation should be
the intention of the lawgivers; thus, if the text of the law itself is
ambiguous, courts may consider statements made in the lawgiving
process by or on behalf of the lawgivers to clarify what their
357
intentions were. Building on this thought, some analysts suggest
that The Federalist should count in constitutional interpretation
because it qualifies as a form of legislative history. The argument
begins with the idea that the intentions of the ratifiers, rather than

355. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND.
L.J. 759, 765 n.25 (1994).
356. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (Apr. 17, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 187, 189 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
357. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005)
(describing the historical use of legislative intent in judicial opinions).
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those of the Philadelphia framers, provide the decisive source of
constitutional meaning because it was the ratifiers who brought the
358
Constitution to life. It thus follows, as Professor Amar has written,
that courts may cite the essays because they “were consciously quoted
and used more than any other source during the ratification
359
period.”
There are major difficulties with this line of analysis. One
difficulty is that some judges and commentators⎯Justice Scalia most
prominently among them⎯do not believe that it is ever legitimate to
360
consider legislative history in interpreting statutes. Adherents of
this position rely in part on the artificiality of ascribing a unitary
intent to the diverse body of representatives who constitute a
361
This argument applies a fortiori to
legislative majority.
constitutional interpretation because it is necessarily more difficult to
discern the intention of thirteen deliberative bodies than to discern
362
the intention of a single legislature. For analysts who think like

358. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 374
(presenting opinion of James Madison that the proposed Constitution “was nothing more than
the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the
voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions”); Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 447, 447–48 (noting that the “legitimate meaning” of
the Constitution must be derived either in the text or “in the sense attached to it by the people
in their respective State Conventions,” not “in the opinions or intentions of the Body which
planned & proposed the Constitution”).
359. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1498 n.285
(1987). A variation on this argument is that, even if the intentions of Philadelphia framers are
paramount, The Federalist provides strong evidence of their intentions because Madison and
Hamilton were present at the Convention and participated in its work. See, e.g., Ducayet, supra
note 275, at 841–42. This history-of-the-writing theory suffers from even more problems than
the history-of-the-ratification approach discussed in the ensuing text, in part because it is
doubtful that the Philadelphia framers’ intentions should count for much of anything in
constitutional exegesis. See supra note 358. Even if their intentions do count, however, it is
questionable whether The Federalist provides a very good account of what those intentions
were. See Ducayet, supra note 275, at 845–47. In part this is the case because of the
argumentative nature of the essays; after all, adoption of an argumentative purpose meant that
“the work was not intended as a recapitulation of the convention deliberations.” Id. at 845
(emphasis added).
360. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29–37 (1997) (explaining
Justice Scalia’s rationale for disfavoring legislative history).
361. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 92 (1984) (noting that “the most humble judge will fail if given a
charge to recreate in his own mind the 535 minds that contemplated yesterday’s problems”).
362. See Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1308 (asserting that “[i]f the collective ‘intent’ of the
bicameral legislature is an incoherent concept, . . . the collective ‘understanding’ of an entire
nation during a constitutional moment must be even more so”). There are other reasons as well
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Justice Scalia, it follows easily that courts may not cite The Federalist
on the theory that it qualifies as legislative (or, more accurately,
363
constitutional) history.
Even for those who endorse the use of legislative history, efforts
to rely on The Federalist raise profound problems. It is now settled as
a historical matter, for example, that the Papers did not circulate
364
widely outside New York. How, then, can they provide legislative
365
history for the ratification conventions as a whole? In addition,
ratification had already occurred in most of the states before many of
the essays (including Hamilton’s famous treatments of the judicial
366
power) were even published. How can the essays provide legislative
history for official action that in fact predated their appearance?
Finally, historians have concluded that the Papers had little impact on
367
the ratification decision even in New York. It is difficult, if not
incoherent, to view Publius’s work as legislative history when “[t]here
is no good evidence that anyone, even in New York, relied on The
368
Federalist as the basis for voting to ratify.”

for viewing constitutional history with more skepticism than legislative history. See, e.g., id. at
1311 (noting that Congress might direct corrective legislation at judicial misreadings of statutes
based on manipulations of legislative history, but cannot cure similar manipulations in the
constitutional context; also worrying that reliance on constitutional history from the founding
period ignores postratification amendments that profoundly altered key themes of the
Constitution). But see id. at 1316–21 (suggesting a possible case for continued use of
constitutional, but not legislative history: Exclusion of legislative history⎯but not constitutional
history⎯may properly respond to modern-day interests groups’ strategic creation of legislative
materials to facilitate later arguments to judges, which in turn distorts the deliberative
lawmaking process).
363. See SCALIA, supra note 360, at 38 (stating that the “original meaning of the text” is
paramount, not “what the original draftsmen intended”).
364. See DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 111 n.25 (finding no record of publication in seven of
the states and that “no more than twelve” of the essays appeared in newspapers outside of
Boston and Philadelphia).
365. See Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1309 (noting that “[n]o historian has rigorously
established that the arguments [in The Federalist] were known and accepted in any other state,
or even for that matter in New York”); Manning, supra note 349, at 1340 (finding no evidence
that ratifiers agreed with the “intricate and often-lengthy essays”); id. at 1355 (questioning
whether a “constitutionally sufficient number of ratifiers” were influenced by The Federalist,
given the Papers’ limited circulation).
366. FURTWANGLER, supra note 251, at 19–21.
367. See McGowan, supra note 224, at 756 (noting overwhelming election of antifederalist
delegates in New York and the key role of Virginia’s acceptance of the Constitution, rather than
of The Federalist, in triggering New York’s ratification).
368. Id.; see also Ducayet, supra note 275, at 846 (noting these and additional problems with
the legislative-history account).
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These problems greatly complicate the case for citing The
Federalist on a legislative-history theory. Perhaps the two greatest
difficulties in doing so, however, spring from the argumentative
character of the work. The first problem is that Hamilton, Madison,
and Jay did not write or publish the essays in the context of
lawmaking operations. Rather, in keeping with their overarching plan
to present an argument to voters, they penned the tracts for
publication as newspaper editorials. As others have observed, it is
difficult to view materials written wholly outside the legislative
369
process as legislative history.
Second, even assuming the essays could surmount this hurdle,
they may well not rank as the sort of legislative history that deserves
significant respect. Courts have long recognized that different forms
370
of legislative history merit different levels of judicial attention, and
in applying this principle there is much reason not to give the The
Federalist high legislative-history marks. For example, Hamilton and
Madison’s project of persuasion led them to defend ideas with which
371
they themselves disagreed. It seems odd to say that, even when
documents are crafted so strategically that they do not reflect their
own authors’ outlook, they can nonetheless qualify as an official
expression of a body of lawgivers on whose behalf those authors
somehow supposedly spoke.
C. The Federalist as Dictionary
As we have seen, Justice Scalia strongly rejects the use of
372
legislative history in interpreting enacted materials. How, then, can

369. See Manning, supra note 349, at 1349 (noting that, because of the anonymity of the
authors, state ratifiers “would have had no reason to believe that Madison, Hamilton, or Jay
were authorized to speak for the Convention”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1295, 1316 (1990) (emphasizing that the essayists lacked authorization to represent the
views expressed at the Philadelphia Convention).
370. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing the superior validity of committee reports above other
forms of legislative history because they are generally “well considered and carefully
prepared”).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 248–50.
372. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
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373

he routinely cite The Federalist? Justice Scalia himself answered this
question in a well-known commentary on the foundations of law:
I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be
delegates to the Constitutional Convention—Hamilton’s and
Madison’s writings in The Federalist, for example. I do so, however,
not because they were Framers and therefore their intent is
authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their writings,
like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time,
display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood.
Thus I give equal weight to Jay’s pieces in The Federalist, and to
Jefferson’s writings, even though neither of them was a Framer.
What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original
374
draftsmen intended.

This approach seems to involve an “abstract, grammatical” use of
375
the Papers. Because the enacted terms of the Constitution are
central to determining “original meaning,” the key question becomes
how those terms were viewed in the time and place of their adoption.
Thus courts may consult The Federalist for much the same reason that
they may consult “Samuel Johnson’s dictionary or any other usage
376
guide.”
The cited text⎯here, The Federalist⎯serves the sole
purpose of shedding light on then-accepted understandings of the
words and phrases that appear in the Constitution.
377
This approach to The Federalist has encountered resistance, in
part because it lends no special weight to the “character and
378
achievements of Hamilton and Madison.” Justice Scalia’s account
would seem to treat no differently than The Federalist a commentary
on the Constitution crafted by a local blacksmith, so long as the
blacksmith understood as well as Publius how the average ratification
delegate would use the words that appear in the Constitution. It
might even be that Justice Scalia would accord as much significance to
the views of “intelligent and informed” antifederalist writers as he
373. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910–15 (1997) (citing cautions in The
Federalist against congressional imposition of duties upon states “without consent of the States,”
id. at 911).
374. SCALIA, supra note 360, at 38.
375. McGowan, supra note 224, at 835.
376. Id. at 757.
377. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1312 (describing Justice Scalia’s approach as
embodying “a weak justification for consulting The Federalist”).
378. McGowan, supra note 224, at 835.
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would ascribe to the views of Publius. The writer Brutus, for example,
detected in the words of the Constitution⎯particularly its vesting of
equity jurisdiction in the Supreme Court⎯a broad grant of authority
379
to the federal judiciary to safeguard unenumerated rights. If Brutus
was bright and fully familiar with proper use of the English language
in late-eighteenth-century America (as he surely was), does it not
follow that we should assign his views on the meaning of the
constitutional text as much significance as the views expressed in The
Federalist? According to Justice Scalia’s methodology, it seems as
though we should.
One might say that judges should be leery of accepting Brutus’s
treatment of the judicial power because he was writing in an effort to
persuade readers to oppose the Constitution. But that is the point. By
symmetry of logic, courts should hesitate to rely on the no-lessadvocacy-driven writings of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. Standard
works by Blackstone or Coke might well serve a dictionary function
by fleshing out generally understood meanings of legal terms
employed in the Constitution. Such works, however, are a far cry
380
from pseudonymously produced newspaper editorials. At the very
least, Justice Scalia’s treatment of The Federalist suffers from a
significant omission in that it offers no explanation as to why its
adversarial argument fairly “display[s] how the text of the
381
Constitution was originally understood.”
D. The Federalist as Treatise
As shown, there is reason to reject both the legislative-history
and dictionary-like-aid approaches to judicial use of The Federalist.
Some analysts have sought to fill the resulting gap by arguing that
courts should consider Publius’s teachings in much the same way they
consider scholarly treatises on law. According to this theory, courts
should approach The Federalist like they approach books written by
Joseph Story or James Kent, or perhaps even Laurence Tribe. As
Professor McGowan notes, “[t]his is how the Court tended to use the

379. See Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 18, at 417, 419 (stating that the Constitution “vests the judicia[ry] with a power to
resolve all questions that may arise on any case on the construction of the constitution”).
380. See Manning, supra note 349, at 1355–59 (cautioning against “equat[ing] the
expressions of Publius with the understanding of the ratifiers”).
381. SCALIA, supra note 360, at 38.
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essays in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it is the only
382
form of reasoning the essays support very well.”
This point of view raises foundational issues about the nature of
constitutional interpretation. To begin with, what business do courts
have relying on treatises in the first place? At least from an ardently
originalist perspective, courts should eschew reliance on treatises, or
at least most of them, because they typically tell more about the views
of the treatise writer than about the views of the framers. Notably, the
leading proponent of the learned-treatise approach seems to concede
this point, acknowledging that treatise-based views of The Federalist
“do not assert that the essays reveal what the drafters of the
Constitution thought . . . , nor do they claim that the essays show what
ordinary speakers of late-eighteenth century English thought the
383
words of the Constitution meant.” Even if The Federalist qualifies
as a learned treatise, this concession is significant because few
judges⎯regardless of the interpretive principles they embrace⎯view
treatises as having the level of interpretive clout normally associated
with The Federalist Papers. The question thus remains of whether the
learned-commentary approach to The Federalist gives the work its full
and proper due.
In any event, the key point developed earlier in this article rubs
up hard against viewing The Federalist as a learned commentary.
Common experience suggests, after all, that what makes “learned
commentaries” learned is in large measure that the relevant writing
reflects the work of a detached, objective, and non-self-interested
scholar. The function of The Federalist as a tool of political debate
makes it hard to view its authors in this light. Put simply, it is strained
to justify reliance on The Federalist by characterizing it as a learned
treatise when its authors wrote it not as a learned treatise but as selfserving campaign literature.
E. The Federalist as Brilliant Philosophy
The preceding discussion focuses on originalist styles of
constitutional interpretation. This is the case because that discussion
primarily addresses the question whether The Federalist can qualify as
a proper indicator of “original intent” or “original meaning” in light

382. McGowan, supra note 224, at 756.
383. Id.
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of its demonstrably political-persuasion-based character. It is hardly
surprising that a consideration of The Federalist’s role in
constitutional interpretation should have an originalist focus. Publius,
after all, wrote his essays during the very time period when original
385
thinking about the Constitution occurred. Yet if there are serious
problems with looking to The Federalist as legislative history or as an
indicator of then-existing linguistic understandings, a surprising
conclusion might follow—namely, that nonoriginalist, rather than
originalist, styles of interpretation provide the firmest basis for
judicial use of The Federalist. Charles Fried, for example, heads in the
direction of this conclusion when he writes that the Papers warrant
judicial attention because of their “intrinsic worth” and because they
reflect “the thought of the wisest men who had occasion to think most
386
deeply” about the Constitution.
Observers other than Fried state even more clearly that The
Federalist should count in constitutional interpretation not because it
reflects the thinking of the Constitution’s ratifiers, but because it
contains unusually wise insights offered by writers deserving of the
387
highest respect. From this vantage point, relying on the writings of
Abraham Lincoln (for example) would parallel judicial invocation of
the writings of Publius. Why? Because Lincoln⎯like Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay⎯had the benefit of deep experience in the affairs
of government, a brilliant understanding of human nature, and
extraordinary practical wisdom. These qualities might not permit
Lincoln to offer much information about the thinking of long-dead
ratification delegates, but they would permit him to make invaluable
observations on how government works best. In fact, the Supreme
Court has cited Lincoln in defining the essential nature of the state-

384. See Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1312–16 (discussing the difference between “original
intent” and “original meaning” but further arguing that this difference is “questionable” and at
best “a fine one”).
385. See McGowan, supra note 224, at 825–26 (noting that recent court cases tend to “cite
The Federalist in connection with decisions based on the ‘original meaning’ or ‘original
understanding’ of the Constitution”).
386. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 63 (1991).
387. See Ducayet, supra note 275, at 825 (suggesting that The Federalist “may serve as a
useful form of constitutional authority by providing a particularly sophisticated theory of
political psychology,” and adding that this “justification treats the work neither as evidence of
the binding ‘intentions’ of the Framers nor as a dated and biased historical artifact, but rather as
a rich lode of insights”); id. at 829–30, 833 (attributing a similar view of The Federalist to Joseph
Story and, at least in part, to historian Charles Beard).
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388

federal relationship. Likewise⎯so the argument goes⎯the Court
should be free to cite the no less timeless and insightful work of
Publius.
There are at least three difficulties with citing The Federalist on
the theory that it embodies wise discourse. First, given the
argumentative character of The Federalist, its pages may well not
embody the most trustworthy⎯as opposed to the most polemically
appealing⎯account of the matters the essays address. Writings that
389
390
attribute “political fanaticism” and “distempered imaginations” to
one’s opponents, for example, do not have the same ring as The
Gettysburg Address. Second, nonoriginalist styles of interpretation
(or at least some of them) are controversial. In particular, concerns
about illegitimacy and indeterminacy would lead many scholars to
bemoan an interpretive principle that read something like this:
“Courts should interpret the Constitution to mean whatever would
cause it to work best in the view of the wisest people.” Yet, the
nonoriginalist argument for invoking The Federalist seems to hinge on
this very notion.
Finally, even assuming that a sound nonoriginalist case for using
The Federalist exists, few would argue that a nonoriginalist
justification would possess as solid a grounding in accepted
391
Put
interpretive traditions as a strong originalist justification.
another way, The Federalist will carry more interpretive heft if both
an originalist theory and a nonoriginalist theory for its invocation are
available. I return, then, to the question whether The Federalist can
properly serve as a reasonable proxy for the intentions and meaning
of those who ratified the Constitution.

388. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) (citing the Gettysburg
Address for the proposition that “[o]urs is a ‘government of the people, by the people, for the
people’”).
389. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185.
390. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 49–50.
391. But cf. Ducayet, supra note 275, at 847–48 (questioning originalist methodologies in
evaluating The Federalist’s proper role in constitutional interpretation). It is outside the
purposes of this Article to explore the comparative merits of originalist and nonoriginalist
methods of interpretation. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the Supreme Court has
long considered references to the framers’ intentions as among the important methods of
constitutional interpretation.
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F. The Federalist as Consensus Understanding
Commentators have offered a rich mix of theories for judicial use
of The Federalist. Yet all of the theories considered so far suffer from
serious shortcomings, or at least from incompleteness. How can it be,
especially from an originalist perspective, that a self-serving set of
campaign tracts should factor into the process of constitutional
interpretation?
Answering this question requires circling back to the original
purpose of The Federalist. As shown, that purpose was to set forth an
argument. What is important, however, is that that argument was of a
particular kind, for the authors rooted their case for persuasion in a
392
meticulous appeal to reason. To be sure, bombast and braggadocio
made their way into the essays, and Publius appealed to visceral
393
concerns and emotional reactions along the way. At its core,
however, The Federalist set forth a relentlessly cohesive and logical
argument built on lessons of experience, accepted principles of
human conduct, and deductions drawn from widely accepted
394
premises.
The decision of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to focus on
reasoned argument carried with it a consequence of great significance
to present-day students of constitutional meaning. Precisely because
Publius’s purpose was to gain support from a broad and diverse
audience with arguments based on reason, the views set forth in the
Papers could be neither sloppy nor personal nor idiosyncratic.
Rather, Publius’s depiction of the Constitution had to reflect a
broadly acceptable view of the document’s meaning. And because
that depiction had to reflect a broadly acceptable view, it seems fair to
conclude that it articulated something that approximated a consensus
395
understanding. It is this reason—coupled with the authors’ genius
and their inside knowledge of the Convention’s thinking⎯that lends
The Federalist a powerful claim to interpretive significance. The
392. See, e.g., supra note 310 (discussing development of this theme by Professor
Furtwangler).
393. See supra Part II.F.
394. See supra Part II.A.–II.E.
395. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 22 (1993)
(noting that The Federalist presented “in aggregate the outer bounds as well as the central
substance of what their authors conceived was the claim they could make⎯the object being
above all persuasion⎯on their readers’ experience, aspirations, and habits of thought”); see also
Ducayet, supra note 275, at 822 (noting that The Federalist “was designed to place the
Constitution in the most desirable light possible”).
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authors’ genius plays a role because it suggests that they would and
did succeed in the task they undertook⎯namely, to construct the best
possible reason-based argument for ratification that, in turn, would
best speak to a wide and diverse audience. The authors’ inside
knowledge facilitated this effort by providing valuable insights about
how the provisions of the Constitution might be elaborated in the
396
And if The
most sensible, coherent and appealing fashion.
Federalist in fact sets forth something like a consensus view, it cannot
help but shed light on the all-important question of what “We the
397
People” meant to say in the words of the Constitution.
In sum, as William Eskridge explains, there are “[c]onventions
that make it reasonable to suppose that certain focal speakers reflect
more than their own views when they make statements in the course
398
of public constitutional . . . debates.” Even more important, there
are powerful reasons to conclude that those conventions apply with
399
added force to the writings of Publius.
G. The Consensus-Understanding View and Other Theories
At the very least, these observations may help to strengthen
other theories that support judicial reliance on The Federalist. To the
extent that the essays qualify as legislative history, for example, it
lends them weight to say that they embodied mainstream viewpoints
that an ordinary ratifier would likely share. In similar fashion, to the

396. It might be said in response that The Federalist reflected at most a likely consensus of
only those pro-Constitution voters in New York. In particular, this argument gains support—at
least on a superficial level⎯from the fact that Publius laced his case for ratification with appeals
that focused on the local interests of New York. See supra text accompanying notes 95–104,
177–87. It seems apparent, however, that the special treatment of New York voters had more to
do with the examples used in the essays to illustrate the Constitution’s effects than with any
effort to define the terms and purposes of the Constitution in light of New York’s special needs.
One significant fact confirms this non-single-state view of the argument made in the essays;
upon their completion, Madison had them carted off to Virginia, where he used them
extensively in arguing for ratification at the convention of his own southern, agrarian, slaveholding state. See KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 258, 261–62 (noting that The Federalist provided
the source of many arguments Madison made at Virginia’s ratification convention); see also
Ducayet, supra note 275, at 822 (noting that the essays “were hastily published in book form so
that they could be distributed to partisans in other states”).
397. See RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 15 (noting that The Federalist Papers are “[f]oremost”
among contemporary sources reflecting the original understanding of the Constitution).
398. Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1313.
399. See id. at 1318 (“[P]ublic dialogue of the sort engaged in by the authors of The
Federalist and the Anti-Federalists is potentially quite reliable for figuring out original
constitutional understanding or meaning.”).
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extent that the essays might give dictionary-like guidance to the
meaning of constitutional words, it helps the case for judicial use that
their authors prepared them with a strong sensitivity to the mind of
the general public, rather than out of mere whim or highly specialized
purposes. This same point may also help to show why the writings of
Publius should count for more than the antifederalist writings of
commentators such as Brutus. Brutus, after all, had every reason to
portray the document’s terms in their most extreme and controversial
light because he was seeking to drive voters away from ratification.
Against this backdrop, when ratifiers adopted the Constitution, it
seems unlikely they said in effect: “We believe that the Constitution
embodies the troubling interpretations put forward by Brutus, rather
than the more moderate interpretations put forward by Publius, but
we are going to ratify anyway.” More likely, they ratified because
they shared something like the consensus-seeking vision, designed to
400
induce the very action they took, put forward in The Federalist.
The consensus-oriented nature of The Federalist may also bolster
its cite-ability on the theory that it is a learned legal treatise or a wise
statement of the principles of sound government. For example,
although it strains common usage to place campaign literature in the
“learned treatise” or “fount of wisdom” pigeonholes, as a general
matter, the effort seems less farfetched when one recalls that this
particular body of campaign material was studiously designed to
appeal to human reason. The “sustained, systematic” character of The
401
Federalist strengthens this suggestion. Hornbook law teaches, for
example, that judges must take care to read the provisions of a legal
402
text in light of one another. Publius’s effort at comprehensiveness
ensured that⎯in treatise-like fashion⎯The Federalist took fair
account of this principle.
It is not surprising that thoughtful observers often point to the
argumentative nature of The Federalist in suggesting that it should
play little role in constitutional interpretation. On close examination,
however, the argumentative nature of the essays helps explain why

400. See id. at 1318 (noting that “key players . . . have incentives to represent the commonly
held views as faithfully as they can, lest they lose parts of the coalition” while opponents’
“strategic statements are worth little in understanding the provision if it is adopted, because
their incentives are to exaggerate and distort the meaning and effect of the provision”).
401. Rakove, supra note 3, at 234.
402. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
47.02, at 139 (5th ed. 1992) (describing “whole act” rule).
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they carry interpretive force. Because Publius sought to appeal to a
broad and diverse audience with methodical arguments rooted in
reason, The Federalist is fairly seen as embodying something like a
then-consensus understanding of the Constitution’s meaning. To be
403
sure, The Federalist does not qualify as “holy writ,” and this is all
404
the more the case because of its campaign-rhetoric roots. As a
result, courts must handle the essays with no less, and perhaps more,
care than other tools of interpretation. At the same time, The
Federalist must be given its due. Over the past two centuries, the
Court has struck this balance in a sensible fashion, refusing to view
the essays as an “authoritative exposition of constitutional
405
meaning” but according them “great respect in expounding the
406
constitution.”
CONCLUSION
The authors of The Federalist set forth an argument that was
layered and complex. They made sure to appeal to the special
interests of their New York readers. To a phalanx of arguments
founded on history and common sense they added color and imagery
designed to bolster their appeals to logical reasoning. Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay urged their readers to recognize the wisdom of
practical accommodation. They appealed to pathos and ethos as well,
particularly by aligning the cause of ratification with America’s
celebrated revolutionary heritage.
What may be gleaned from the authors’ nuanced interweaving of
these different strands of argument? To begin with, the account
offered here removes any doubt about the centrality of strategic and
politically motivated argument to the plan of Publius. This intensely
partisan purpose in turn provides good reason not to accept blindly
the essays as a determinative statement of the Constitution’s purposes
and meaning. At the same time, the argumentative tenor of The
Federalist does not strip it of significance as a source of constitutional
exegesis. Indeed, the persuasion-driven character of The

403. Tillman, supra note 218, at 617.
404. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 349, at 1358 (noting that, while “the room for strategic
maneuvering might have been circumscribed by the need to make plausible arguments,”
nonetheless “[w]ithin that range . . . the exposition of particular understandings or provisions
might well reflect the shadings of political strategy”).
405. Id. at 1365.
406. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
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Federalist⎯founded on comprehensive arguments directed at a broad
audience and rooted firmly in reason⎯tends to support the view that
the writings of Publius approximated a widely shared, then-existing,
coherent understanding of the Constitution.
Whatever one concludes about these matters, one thing is
certain. The intensely political purposes of The Federalist’s authors
brought about the enduring impact of their work. It was the ardor and
enthusiasm that the authors brought to their task, after all, that
generated the clarity, comprehensiveness, and overarching quality
that have ensured the Papers’ persisting fame. To be sure, Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay focused their energies on pushing the case for
ratification among citizens of their own time and place. They did so,
however, with the all-out effort of single-minded advocates bent on
promoting a cause they viewed as transcendently important. It was
this drive to persuade, fueled by passionate commitment, that
produced what may well be—as Thomas Jefferson put it—“the best
commentary on the principles of government which ever was
407
written.”

407. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON
1776–1826, at 566, 567 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
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